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MONOPOLIZATION OF COMPUTER PERIPHERAL
EQUIPMENT: Telex Corp. v. International Business
Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975)
By CHRISTOPHER NORGAARD*
INTRODUCTION
Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp. I repre-
sents the first major decision in a series of antitrust actions which
have been lodged in recent years against the International Busi-
ness Machines Corporation (IBM) by both IBM's competitors
and the Justice Department.' Prior to reversal by the Tenth Cir-
cuit, Telex had obtained one of the largest damage awards in the
history of American litigation.' The trial court judge, A. Sherman
Christensen,' found that IBM's success had generally been due to
its skill, industry, and foresight, and, specifically, that IBM had
set the standard of quality in the industry for products and serv-
ices.5 But because IBM was also found to have a high percentage
* Associate, Grant, McHendrie, Haines and Crouse, Denver, Colorado; A.B., 1970,
Stanford University; J.D., 1973, Georgetown University.
510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 96 S. Ct. 8 (1975), rev'g 367 F.
Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973).
2 Telex's numerous compatriots who have similarly beseiged IBM with suits alleging
monopolization of the "peripheral equipment" part of the electronic data processing
(EDP) industry have had their actions consolidated for trial in the Northern District of
California and assigned to Judge Ray McNichols for pretrial proceedings. Discovery is
continuing and trial has tentatively been set for late 1976 and early 1977. The consolidated
action is entitled In re IBM Antitrust Cases, MDL No. 163 (N.D. Cal., filed April 11,
1975). To date, one case, Marshall Industries v. IBM, has been settled and dismissed. See
note 8 infra. The Justice Department's action, United States v. IBM Corp., No. 69 Civ.
200 (S.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 11, 1974), is now in trial before Judge Edelstein. The Justice
Department is seeking to break IBM into smaller units on the basis of alleged monopoliza-
tion of mainframes as well as peripheral products.
The district court awarded plaintiff Telex $259.5 million in treble damages and $1.2
million in legal fees. 367 F. Supp. at 363-64.
Judge Christensen, Senior Judge for the District Court of Utah, was assigned spe-
cially to the Telex case. For the procedural background, see Id. at 267-69.
5 Id. at 306.
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of the relevant market as defined by the district court, IBM's
introduction of products at lower prices, in ways which were
stated to be lawful absent such a market share, was deemed
violative of the antitrust laws to the extent that a competitor
(Telex) was injured.' The United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit reversed the antitrust decision. The appellate
court, however, believed itself so constrained by the market share
test that it went off in search of a new and larger market (of which
IBM's percentage share was relatively low), finding one only by
introducing a new and logically unwarranted concept of supply
substitutability.7
The Telex case was settled prior to a decision by the United
States Supreme Court on whether to grant certiorari.' Each side
dismissed its claims with prejudice, although certain injunctive
provisions of the Tenth Circuit's decree relative to Telex's misap-
propriation of IBM trade secrets remain in effect. Claims based
on activities outside of the United States, which had been ex-
cluded from the case by stipulation of the parties, will not be
pursued. The settlement makes the Tenth Circuit's decision all
the more important; moreover, it is likely that the Supreme Court
will at some time render a decision on the facts of Telex in either
the Justice Department action or the other consolidated cases.'
This article suggests that courts should relax the market
share test in favor of a more comprehensive industry analysis
' Although the court does not make a general finding on this point, it is supported
by the court's specific findings in its separate discussions of each challenged act. See, e.g.,
id. at 294, 296-97, 299, 301, 306, 342, 345, 346, 347.
7 510 F.2d at 897, 917. Supply substitutability and reasonable interchangeability are
two terms which describe the same concept. The former term is used throughout this
article and in the district court's opinion; the Tenth Circuit uses the latter term.
The court of appeals affirmed judgment in favor of IBM on its counterclaim for
misappropriation of trade secrets, but reduced the compensatory damages to $17.5 million
while affirming the $1 million punitive damages award.
Wall Street Journal, Oct. 6, 1975, at 6. Telex stated in documents filed with the
SEC that it would be unable to pay the $18.5 million IBM counterclaim damages awarded
by the Tenth Circuit. IBM has also settled a peripheral products action brought by
Marshall Industries, which has since sold its electronic data processing operations to
Mohawk Data Sciences for a cash payment of $800,000. Marshall had sought $36 million
in actual damages. The other plaintiffs have generally stated that they intend to press
ahead notwithstanding the Telex and Marshall settlements, which they view as motivated
by the special financial conditions of the settling plaintiffs. Id., Sept. 30, 1975, at 16. See
also note 2 supra.
' See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
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when monopolization is alleged, with the focus on what should be
the ultimate issue in any monopolization case: Has the defendant
demonstrated the power to control prices or exclude competition?
The Supreme Court has pointed the way with its recent treat-
ment of merger cases under section 7 of the Clayton Act. 0 In
United States v. General Dynamics" the Supreme Court rejected
the talisman of market share in favor of a detailed examination
of industry trends and economics.
Indeed, it may be seriously wondered whether monopoly
power resulting from single firm growth is even possible in the
absence of governmental intervention or capital curtailment and
absent conduct independently violative of the antitrust laws.
Moreover, any possible detriment resulting from short-term mo-
nopoly position should be outweighed by the benefits of a relaxed
monopolization policy in shaking up complacent, oligopolistic
major manufacturing industries.
I. NATURE OF THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY
A. Electronic Data Processing Systems 2
An EDP system has two general parts: A central processing
unit (CPU or mainframe) which controls the system and performs
logical operations such as additions, subtractions, and compari-
sons; and peripheral equipment consisting of input devices, out-
put devices, and storage devices. 3 The CPU and peripheral
equipment are controlled by a sequence of instructions which tells
the system how to perform a given function. This sequence of
instructions is known as "software"; the CPU and peripheral
equipment are known as "hardware." Peripheral equipment is a
necessary and important equipment group which now accounts
for 50 to 75 percent of a new system's price. Peripheral equipment
includes a number of different devices performing varied func-
tions.
The first function is storage of information for processing.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
415 U.S. 486 (1974).
2 This discussion is based largely on the district court's findings of fact, nos. 24-34.
See 367 F. Supp. at 273-75. See also Briefs for Appellant and Appellee.
11 Peripheral devices, however, can also perform control functions. Moreover, peri-
pherals such as tape and disk drives have their own controllers.
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Storage devices include magnetic disk spindles, magnetic tape
drives, and memories. Tapes and disks are somewhat analogous
to conventional recording tapes and phonograph records respec-
tively. Disk drives are faster and more expensive than tape drives.
Memories are even faster and more expensive than disks. In addi-
tion to peripheral memories, all CPU's have a minimum memory
capacity of their own, and increasingly larger memories are being
integrated into CPU's. Data is transmitted to the processor and
returned in processed form through memories. Disks and tapes
are a more permanent storage media from which data can be
transferred to memories for processing.
Two additional peripheral equipment functions are input
and output. Input is the conversion of data from language or
numbers to electronic signals for processing; output is the conver-
sion of electronic signals back to printed or typed language for
display on paper or a television-like screen. Output devices can
also be used to perform further mechanical functions, including
the operation of other computer systems. Some examples of
input-output peripheral equipment are teletype machines, type-
writer terminals, card punches, punch card readers, and readers
of characters on checks or merchandise. Both tapes and disks can
also perform input and output functions.
A peripheral device is said to be "plug compatible" with
other components of a system when it can be "plugged" into that
system without modification. Peripherals designed for one system
can be used in another system only if the manufacturer changes
the "interface" attachment between the peripheral device and
the other system components. Such interface modifications con-
stitute a very small part of a peripheral device's manufacturing
cost. I4
Computer equipment is classified by generations (first, sec-
ond, third, or fourth generation) according to the technology used
in producing the equipment. A higher numbered generation in-
corporates significant technological advances, usually resulting in
an improved price/performance ratio over the generation preced-
ing it. First generation equipment was initially produced in 1952,
" For example, the total engineering cost required for Telex to modify its first tape
drive for use in the IBM System 360 was $42,000. See 367 F. Supp. at 270.
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and equipment of the succeeding generations appeared in 1958,
1964, and 1970.'1
B. The Computer Industry'6
As of 1972, 96 companies manufactured and marketed all
components required for a complete EDP system and were thus
considered systems manufacturers. About seven of these are con-
sidered principal manufacturers; they include IBM, which was
found by the district court to have 35 to 45 percent of the systems
market, Sperry Rand Univac, Honeywell, Control Data, Bur-
roughs, National Cash Register, and Digital Equipment Corpora-
tion. 7
In addition, a large number of generally smaller companies
manufacture and market only peripheral equipment for use in
systems manufactured by others. IBM systems customers are the
chief market for peripherals made by others because IBM, as the
industry leader, has the largest number of installed systems. The
manufacture by others of peripherals plug compatible with IBM
systems received its primary boost by the widespread success of
IBM's third generation System 360, first marketed in 1964. In
1966 Telex and other manufacturers began marketing peripheral
equipment which was "plug compatible" with the System 360.
IBM's plug compatible manufacturer (PCM) competitors
market copies of IBM peripherals. The PCM's wait until IBM has
brought a system to market and then duplicate the peripheral
devices through reverse engineering. IBM's lead time over Telex,
i.e., the time required for Telex to study, duplicate, and market
its own plug compatible copy, has generally been at least 11/2 to
" Brief for Appellant at 17. IBM's fourth generation equipment is the System 370,
which includes the Merlin (3330) disk and the Aspen (3420) tape. In 1972, a new field
effect transistor memory was introduced with the new Models 158 and 168 of the System
370 CPU. The System 370 components will be referred to as fourth generation products,
although, as discussed below, it is not clear that they offer sufficiently improved
price/performance characteristics to constitute a new or separate market for purposes of
assessing liability for monopolization. See text accompanying notes 100-05 infra.
1' This discussion is based largely on the district court's findings of fact, nos. 17-23.
See 367 F. Supp. at 271-73. See also Briefs for Appellant and Appellee.
11 General Electric, RCA, and, very recently, Xerox have left the industry. Sperry
Rand Univac and Honeywell, respectively, have taken over the RCA and General Electric
operations. Honeywell has signed a letter of intent to service installed Xerox computers
and is negotiating for the purchase of Xerox's manufacturing operations. Wall Street
Journal, Dec. 9, 1975, at 7.
1976
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2 years, absent illegal appropriation of IBM trade secrets.'" IBM's
total costs are accordingly higher than those of its peripheral
competitors, although its manufacturing costs alone appear to be
10 to 15 percent less than those of Telex. Of course, if its manufac-
turing costs were not less than those of Telex, IBM would presum-
ably have strong incentive not to manufacture its own peripherals
but simply to engage Telex as a supplier. Many "Telex" branded
peripheral components are manufactured by other suppliers for
final assembly and marketing by Telex.' 9
A user can change its installed peripherals either by replac-
ing only the peripherals on a box-for-box basis, or by converting
to an entirely different system. While most users can replace on
a box-for-box basis with relative ease, the same is not true for
converting to a different system. Systems purchasers and lessees
are typically large and increasingly sophisticated institutions.
They include government agencies, universities, and business
corporations. A great deal of customwork must go into the design
and installation of each system for its particular use. Precise
configuration and selection of equipment must be made, based
upon the customer's needs, space, and financial limitations, and
the customer's data must be appropriately programmed and its
personnel trained. Because of the reprogramming which is re-
quired in addition to reinstallation and retraining, there is a sig-
nificant conversion-cost barrier encountered by a user seeking to
replace its present system with another. Apparently, there are no
statistics indicative of the height of this barrier, but some indus-
try personnel have estimated that a systems manufacturer or
marketer has perhaps a 20 to 25 percent chance, at best, of sur-
mounting the barrier to obtain customer conversion to a system
which otherwise offers price/performance advantages over the
customer's existing system.20
'" Such misappropriation was found to have occurred in connection with the Telex
copies of IBM's fourth generation tapes and disk drives. A table in the district court
decision shows a comparison of the IBM product introduction dates with those of equiva-
lent Telex introductions. 367 F. Supp. at 292.
" Telex disk drives are purchased from Information Storage Systems, a Sperry Rand
subsidiary. The basic mechanism for Telex printers is purchased from Control Data. The
basic parts of the Telex memories have been purchased from various suppliers.
21 Various computer industry personnel were contacted with regard to background
information important to an understanding of antitrust principles in the EDP industry
but not discussed in the briefs or court opinions.
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Price/performance considerations of the product itself, how-
ever, are dominant when a customer considers a PCM offer to
replace one or more peripherals with PCM products. Moreover,
it appears to be fairly common for such price/performance consid-
erations to induce a new system customer to substitute PCM
equipment directly at the time of the system purchase. Telex
itself has purchased IBM CPU's and offered them to new custom-
ers in conjunction with Telex peripherals.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND TO CONTROVERSY
A. IBM's Responses to Its Declining Peripheral Product Market
Share During the 1969-1972 Period
The years 1969 and 1970 saw substantial erosion of IBM's
market share of System 360 compatible disk drives in favor of
Telex and other PCM's who were marketing such products at
prices substantially below those of IBM. The IBM 2314 series disk
drive and controller was the disk component of the System 360.1
Telex shipments of its 5314 disk drive and controller, equivalent
to the IBM 2314 series, began in April 1970, and by December
1970 the PCM's had replaced at least 5.3 percent of the 2314-type
disk drives attached to IBM systems.
IBM's first response to the market erosion problem studied
by a task force created in February 197022 was the 2319A disk
drive for Model 145 of IBM's new System 370.3 The 2319A an-
nouncement was made on September 23, 1970, and its stated
purpose was to provide a smaller and cheaper disk drive alterna-
tive for the 370/145 CPU than the fourth generation Merlin 3330
disk drive. To produce the 2319A, IBM began with a 2314 series
four-spindle disk drive and removed one of the spindles, reducing
storage capacity by one-fourth. The control function, which had
been performed by an independent controller on the 2314 series
" The 2314 disk drive was available in three basic configurations: The 2312, contain-
ing one disk-drive spindle; the 2318, containing two spindles; and the 2313, containing four
spindles.
22 IBM designated peripherals as a "Key Corporate Strategic Issue" in February 1970.
One month later a task force was formed, headed by H. E. Cooley, Vice President of IBM's
Systems Development Division. On July 31, 1970, the Cooley task force reported to IBM's
management review committee. 367 F. Supp. at 293.
" For a discussion of IBM's marketing of the 2319A disk drive, see the district court's
findings of fact, 367 F. Supp. at 293-94, and the court of appeals' opinion, 510 F.2d at 900-
02.
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models, was split into two parts, with one part placed inside the
2319A box itself and the other moved into the 370/145 CPU. The
2319A was priced substantially below both the 2314 series unit,
which was still available for use with the 370/145, and the PCM
equivalents. Its monthly rental was $1,550, compared with a total
monthly rental of $2,875 for the comparable 2314 series unit. 4 Its
rental was also a minimum of $300 below Telex's monthly rental
for its equivalent product. The 2319A's price was not below pro-
duction costs and was projected to produce a profit margin in
excess of 20 percent on expected sales volume.
A second peripheral task force was formed by IBM in Octo-
ber 1970. ' The new task force analyzed IBM's PCM competitors
in some depth, including their manufacturing costs and cash flow
relating to 2314 series products. Its report concluded that Telex
was a viable competitor in a number of respects, but that its
manufacturing costs were 10 to 15 percent above those of IBM.
The report, after finding that Telex and Memorex were IBM's two
chief PCM competitors, undertook to forecast the effect on them
of various 2314 price cuts. IBM believed that Memorex and Telex
would respond to 2314 price cuts with reductions of their own, but
that such reductions would have a very serious impact on their
profits and revenues.
IBM announced the 2319B disk drive on December 14, 1970.
It could be used with all System 360 CPU's. The 2319B had the
same storage capacity as the 2319A, but, unlike the 2319A, con-
trol logic was not moved to the CPU. The monthly rental price
for the new unit was more than $1,000 below that of its 2314 series
equivalent, $270 below the monthly rental of Telex's 2319B equiv-
alent, and $235 below the average PCM rental for such a product.
In addition, IBM's extra use charges, which Telex did not have
and which IBM knew to be a source of customer irritation and
expense, were eliminated on the 2319A, 2319B, and fourth genera-
tion 3330 disk drives. As the district court noted, the 2319B an-
nouncement was "purely a price cut" which did not purport to
increase performance over the 2314 series disk subsystems. 6
" 367 F. Supp. at 293.




The 2319 pricing actions did not reverse the decline of IBM's
market share. The PCM's, including Telex, made responsive
price cuts to levels substantially below those of IBM. They had
the additional advantage of "complete modularity," i.e., their
disks were available in a greater variety of storage capacities so
that they were able to "sell between" IBM's 2319 configurations.
Also, Telex was able to meet the IBM price reduction, because it
negotiated a 28 percent price reduction from its 2314-type sup-
plier, Information Storage Systems. Between November 1970 and
December 31, 1972, Telex shipped 1,074 more 2314-type disk
drives and 191 more 2314-type disk controllers than it had pre-
dicted. By December 1972, the PCM share of 2314/2319-type disk
equipment was 21.6 percent, and the PCM share of all disk drives
installed on IBM CPU's was 17.5 percent.
B. IBM's Fixed-Term Leasing Plan
In the first quarter of 1971, Mr. Whitcomb of IBM prepared
another study of PCM's which was presented to the president of
IBM and to IBM's management review committee. 7 It estimated
that by 1976 IBM would lose 19 percent of the plug compatible
tape market and 28.7 percent of the disk market, including 48
percent of the fourth generation 3330 disk installations. The
study recognized that defending against the PCM's was difficult
due to their pricing and performance advantages and recom-
mended frequent improvements in technology, as well as pricing
actions, to exploit IBM's new product lead time. It also recom-
mended the consideration of long-term leases. It raised a warn-
ing flag of possible substantial erosion in printers and memories;
in 1970, IBM had begun to suspect that Telex would soon offer
a memory device. A task force, known informally within the IBM
organization as the "Blue Ribbon Task Force," was formed to
develop a new peripheral strategy. On May 6, 1971, the task force
recommended drastic tape and disk price cuts ranging from 15 to
50 percent. Instead of accepting this recommendation, the man-
agement review committee, apparently on the wishes of IBM
President Frank T. Cary, suggested a long-term leasing approach.
The fixed-term leasing plan (FTP) was formulated, and upon
approval by the management review committee on May 25, 1971,
17 Id. at 297-98. See also 510 F.2d at 904.
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was announced to the public 2 days later." The task force antici-
pated that FTP would reduce revenue by more than $75 million
in 1971 and 1972, but believed that it would produce a profit in
the long run due to reduced market shares for PCM's and less
churning of equipment.
FTP covered disks, tapes, and printers. It provided for a 15
percent reduction in purchase price. For lease customers, it pro-
vided an alternative to the current 30-day rental contract with
discounts of 8 percent on a 1-year lease and 16 percent on a 2-
year lease. Additional use charges were also eliminated for all
products covered by the plan. The total effective monthly rental
reduction on the 2-year plan was 31 percent on disks and 20
percent on tapes. The reduction on printers was in the 30-35
percent range. The cuts put prices of products covered by the
plan "in some instances" below those of the PCM's. Nevertheless,
Telex and the other PCM's managed to respond by generally
lowering their prices below those of IBM. Telex prices were lower
than those of IBM at all times within the 1968-72 period, except
on "four isolated occasions," and Telex's prices were generally
somewhat higher than those of the other PCM's. 9
IBM imposed termination penalties of 5 times the monthly
rental charge in the event of termination of a 2-year lease during
its first year, and 21/2 times the monthly rental charge for termi-
nation of a 2-year lease during its second year or for termination
of a 1-year lease. The plan was completely optional, i.e., custom-
ers could still purchase the peripheral equipment outright or lease
it under the normal 30-day rental arrangement. 0
FTP was not motivated only by the failure of the 2319 pricing
367 F. Supp. at 298.
Id. at 299. The district court found that:
Telex's prices were generally higher than the prices of other plug compatible
manufacturers. In addition, Telex and the other plug compatible manufac-
turers generally reduced below list the prices they actually charged through
various forms of price concessions.
Id.
Id Id. The Extended Term Plan, announced in March 1972, was a variation of FTP
and was found by the district court to have no substantially different economic impact or
consequence in this case. In March 1973 IBM announced a term-lease plan which offered
a 4-year lease on System 370 virtual storage processors. FTP, Extended Term Plan, and
the 4-year term lease were all alternatives to the normal 30-day lease-and-purchase op-
tions. Id. at 300.
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actions to stop the rapid erosion of IBM's disk and tape market
shares. Because IBM, unlike its plug compatible competitors,
had employed no long-term lease of any kind prior to FTP, it had
suffered substantial returns of its equipment during the 1970-71
inflationary/recessionary period. This ill fortune had not been
shared by the PCM's or by IBM's systems competitors, who gen-
erally leased their equipment for 1, 2, or more years.' In 1970
IBM's sales force had achieved only 50 percent of its objective,
and in 1971 IBM experienced the "worst sales record year" 2 in
its history, as gross income growth was sluggish and earnings
flattened out.3
The effect of FTP was found to be a successful suppression
of further PCM growth in the disk, tape, and printer markets.
The basis of this finding was that between June 1971 and Decem-
ber 1972 the PCM share of the disk market did not exceed 17.5
percent, and the PCM share of the tape market did not exceed
15 percent. This is not to say, however, that the PCM tape and
disk drive market shares did not increase somewhat after June
1971. The PCM share of all plug compatible disk drives increased
from 14.5 percent in June 1971 to 17.5 percent in December 1972.
The PCM 2314/2319 disk drive share increased from 14.7 percent
in June 1971 to 21.6 percent in December 1972. The PCM share
of the total tape market during the same period increased only
from 13.7 percent to 14.9 percent. This retarded growth rate was
apparently due chiefly to IBM's success with its fourth generation
Aspen 3420 tape drive, which was announced in November 1970
and first shipped in September 1971. The PCM share of third
generation tapes increased during the same period from 13.7 per-
cent to 21.6 percent.
Nevertheless, the fixed-term plan was in many respects a
success for IBM. By July 22, 1971, 40 percent of those who were
already IBM disk, tape, and printer customers had signed up
with FTP. IBM records showed that 90 percent of its new fourth
generation 3330 disk and 3420 tape products were being installed
under FTP. Immediately following FTP, and notwithstanding
" Id. at 297.
32 Id.
33 Annual Report for the Year Ended December 31, 1974, International Business
Machines Corp., Jan. 28, 1975, at 28-29.
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competitive price reductions by Telex and three other PCM's,
IBM estimated that the order rate of the PCM's had been cut by
50 percent. By the end of 1971, 6 months after the introduction
of FTP, IBM estimated a 62 percent decrease in monthly PCM
sales of tape products. The same analysis estimated that in the
41/2 months subsequent to the FTP announcement, PCM
monthly disk sales were off 48 percent from their rate during the
first 5 months of 1971.
The district court emphasized an IBM document which had
attempted to forecast FTP effects on PCM's. This document had
predicted that the PCM's would offer long-term leases similar to
those of IBM but with base rentals initially 10 percent below
those of IBM and declining 5 percent per year. The forecast
noted, however, that in the disk area the initial PCM installa-
tions would be conversions from the third generation 2314 series
rather than replacements of fourth generation 3330's, because the
3330 was a new product not yet copied by the PCM's and was
being widely installed under FTP. IBM estimated that by the
time the 3330 leases approached maturity, it would be able to
introduce more new products to hold its market share. IBM also
predicted that FTP would further encourage customers to move
from the 2314 series to the 3330 series disk products.
C. IBM's Pricing of CPU's and Memories
IBM documents indicated that some IBM executives had
believed that once FTP was announced it would have to be ap-
plied across the board and could not be confined to peripherals. 4
In late June 1971, however, IBM rejected any extension of FTP
to CPU's and memories on the grounds that such an extension
would "prematurely erode the FTP concept to the entire product
line, and, in addition, would be ineffective unless accompanied
by some degree of pricing action. '3 5 In July 1971 CPU prices were
raised, with the increase ranging from 4 to 8 percent.3 1 IBM's
position was that the increase simply reflected higher costs during
the 1970-71 period, as shown by Federal Price Commission ap-
" See 367 F. Supp. at 300.
I /d.
" On March 30, 1971, the Data Processing Group had recommended to IBM's man-
agement review committee that CPU prices be raised. Id.
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proval of the increase. On August 5, 1971, Mr. Powell of IBM
wrote that the net effect of FTP in conjunction with the July 1971
CPU and memory price increase would "probably be a wash inso-
far as business volumes are concerned. . . .The net effect of the
FTP and price changes will not significantly increase [the cus-
tomers'] total cost and no system decreases were forecast."37
On August 2, 1972, IBM announced its new 370/158 and
370/168 CPU's. The 158 CPU monthly rental was $30,700, com-
pared to $20,600 for a 370/155 CPU. The monthly rental for the
168 CPU was $48,600, as opposed to $36,400 for a 370/165 CPU.
The 158 and 168 offered improved performance, but the district
court found that the price increase outweighed the performance
increase. At the same time, IBM also announced a new auxiliary
memory to be used with the 158 and 168, at a price of $5,200 per
megabyte per month," which was substantially below IBM's
prior memory prices. On the basis of IBM's studies and memo-
randa, the trial court concluded that: (1) The 1971 price hikes on
CPU's and memories had been specifically planned to offset reve-
nue reductions resulting from the 2319 and FTP programs; and
(2) the 1972 CPU prices on the 158 and 168 CPU's had been
planned in conjunction with low prices on the memories to be
used with the CPU's to bar entry of memory competitors.
The memory utilized with the older 370/155 and 370/165
CPU's, announced in June 1970, was a magnetic core memory,
which because of its relatively large size, was contained in boxes
independent of the CPU. Telex had announced its competing
memory, the 6360, in November 1971, and had begun customer
shipments in November 1972. Although the record apparently
did not contain market share information for memories in the
same detail as for disks and tapes, the charts and testimony of
IBM's Mr. Bonham showed, and the district court found, that
in 1970 IBM had received 99.6 percent of all revenues from
memory products attached to IBM CPU's. It should be noted,
however, that the 1970 measurement was prior to Telex's entry
into the plug compatible memory market. It appears that there
was virtually no PCM competition for memories plug compatible
37 Id.
3' A "byte" is one character of data, often shorter than a word and made up of several
"bits." A "megabyte" is one million characters of data.
1976
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with IBM's third generation System 360, and none whatsoever by
Telex.
In 1970 IBM internal documents had forecast that by 1976
PCM's might sell up to 23 percent of the memories installed with
IBM's fourth generation System 370. IBM's forecast had also
indicated that PCM's could become viable competitors by offer-
ing memories at $6,000 per megabyte per month if that price were
under IBM's price. Meanwhile, work was progressing on replace-
ment of the magnetic core technology, on which IBM's forecast
had been based, with field effect transistor, semi-conductor cir-
cuitry. The new technology allowed production of much smaller
memories at much lower cost. Indeed, IBM has stated that the
new memory was 40 times smaller than the old magnetic core and
cost less than one-half as much to make. 9 The new memory price
of $5,200 per megabyte per month compared with a $12,000
monthly rental for the core memory. Nevertheless, Telex an-
nounced a competing memory for the 158 and 168 models in
March 1973, and Control Data, Itel, Ampex, and Intel also an-
nounced competing memories at prices substantially below those
of IBM." '
D. The District Court's Market Share Statistics
Market share figures with regard to peripherals are "not
readily available from published sources, nor can they be extrapo-
lated or inferred from census data dealing with peripheral prod-
ucts in general . . . ."I' The court accordingly relied on the testi-
mony and charts of Mr. Bonham of IBM, as well as other charts
based on IBM internal documents. The disk and tape percentage
market shares shown on the charts are summarized in Table 1.
510 F.2d at 907.
367 F. Supp. at 304. IBM had considered raising the "minimum" memory con-
tained within its System 370/145, 155, 165, and 195 CPU's to reduce the additional mem-
ory capacity required and thus shield more memory capacity from PCM competition.
Apparently these proposals were not carried into effect. Id. at 304-05. The district court
found no evidence that IBM had reduced its prices below cost and found further that all
of the acts challenged by Telex had been calculated to produce profit margins of at least
20 percent on the volume expected to be sold. Id. at 306. The court also found that IBM
was the quality leader for products and services in the EDP industry and that its success
was due "in substantial measure to its skill, industry and foresight." Id.







12/70 6/71 12/71 6/72 12/72
IBM: IBM owned 65.8 62.2 59.0 47.9 32.4
IBM: User owned 10.3 10.6 12.0 16.6 24.1
IBM: Leasing company owned 13.7 13.5 13.9 17.5 21.9
PCM 10.2 13.7 15.1 18.0 21.6
Fourth Generation
12/70 6/71 12/71 6/72 12/72
IBM: IBM owned 0.0 0.0 95.7 92.6 87.4
IBM: User owned 0.0 100.0 4.0 2.3 3.7
IBM: Leasing company owned 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
PCM 0.0 0.0 0.3 5.0 8.7
(PCM shipments did not begin until November 1971).
Combined Third and Fourth Generation
12/70 6/71 12/71 6/72 12/72
"IBM" 89.8 86.3 86.0 86.1 85.1
PCM 10.2 13.7 14.0 13.9 14.9
DISK SPINDLES
Third Generation
12/70 6/71 12/71 6/72 12/72
IBM: IBM owned 62.0 54.8 53.1 49.0 45.0
IBM: User owned 14.8 15.1 15.5 16.8 19.1
IBM: Leasing company owned 16.4 15.6 15.1 15.2 15.3
PCM 6.8 14.5 16.3 19.0 20.6
," This table is from the district court opinion. Id. at 288-90. The percentages given
for combined third and fourth generation tapes and disks were calculated from the court's
figures. The Bonham charts apparently contained information on peripheral product reve-
nues which generally did not go beyond 1970. The other charts were those primarily relied
on by the district court and measured market shares for disks and tapes, but not other
products, at five 6-month intervals: December 1970, June 1971, December 1971, June
1972, and December 1972. The court classified as "IBM" tapes and disks not only those
still owned by IBM and leased to users, but also those owned by users and leasing compa-
nies. The court stated that the "PCM" tapes and disks also included both sold and leased
PCM products, but the PCM statistics, unlike those relating to IBM products, do not
indicate how many PCM products were sold and how many were leased. IBM, however,




12/70 6/71 12/71 6/72 12/72
IBM: IBM owned 0.0 0.0 86.1 90.6 90.5
IBM: User owned 0.0 100.0 13.4 8.6 7.6
IBM: Leasing company owned 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.8 1.2
PCM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7
(PCM shipments did not begin until October 1972).
Combined Third and Fourth Generation
12/70 6/71 12/71 6/72 12/72
"IBM" 93.2 85.5 84.2 82.7 82.5
PCM 6.8 14.5 15.8 17.3 17.5
III. THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION
The district court rejected IBM's contention that the rele-
vant market consists of the entire EDP industry or, in the alterna-
tive, peripheral products compatible with all systems. It held,
instead, that the relevant market consists of peripherals plug
compatible with IBM systems and that submarkets exist for plug
compatible tapes, disks, memories, and printers, together with
their respective controllers and communication controllers. 3 The
court did not analyze the submarkets in further detail because
IBM's share of each submarket was held sufficient to raise an
inference of monopoly power and because IBM's predatory acts,
as well as documents evidencing general predatory intent, ap-
plied to all of the submarkets except communication controllers.
The court awarded damages to Telex of $259.5 million after tre-
bling, plus $1.2 million in attorney's fees and costs.44
The trial court recognized the general rule that monopoliza-
tion in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act45 involves two
elements:
(1) The possession of monopoly power in the relevant market or
submarket and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power with intent to monopolize, which intent need not be evi-
denced by predatory practices but which is not to be gathered
merely from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen or historic accident."6
367 F. Supp. at 282.
' See note 3 supra.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
367 F. Supp. at 335.
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The court also defined monopoly power, in accordance with lead-
ing Supreme Court cases, as "the power to control prices or to
unreasonably restrict competition." 7 The relevant market within
which such power must be found is both a geographic market and
a product market. In Telex the geographic market was the United
States, with international aspects having been excluded by stipu-
lation of the parties. The test for whether two products compete
in the same product market is whether they are "reasonably in-
terchangeable by consumers for the same purposes."" The prime
determinant of "reasonable interchangeability" has in turn been
cross-elasticity of demand: If a slight rise in the price of one
product will cause a substantial number of users to buy another
product, the two products can be said to be competing in the
same market.
The district court and, apparently, the parties themselves,
however, did not make any statistical analysis of cross-elasticity
of demand in the computer industry. Indeed, the court only fleet-
ingly mentioned the concept. 9 The court was instead impressed
by IBM actions which, on the basis of the documents explaining
or appearing to explain them, were aimed primarily at the PCM's
following their rather spectacular initial success in installing
equipment on IBM systems. The court also stated that the only
physical or functional competition for peripheral equipment on a
"box-for-box" basis, without changing CPU's, was between IBM
and the PCM's, and that:
IBM's Systems competitors were not directly affected by IBM's
pricing and product actions for peripherals and made no competitive
price responses to IBM's 2319A and B and Fixed Term Plan (FTP)
price reductions for its peripheral products. After FTP, IBM's Sys-
tems competitors were not mentioned in any of IBM's FTP tracking
documents as having cut or reduced their price for any of their
products. Time sharing companies, service bureaus, and data cen-
ters, were not directly affected by IBM's price and product actions
for peripherals, and after 2319A and B and FTP made little if any
competitive pricing responses to IBM's peripheral price reductions."
Not completely unwilling to recognize the effect of other sys-
7 Id. at 336.
" United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).
" See, e.g., 367 F. Supp. at 282.
I" Id. at 281.
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tems manufacturers on IBM's peripheral product actions, the
court found that:
It cannot be gainsaid that indirectly at least and to some degree the
peripheral products attached to non-IBM systems necessarily com-
pete with and constrain IBM's power with respect to peripherals
attached to IBM systems. The quality and price/performance of the
peripherals attached to a system are a substantial factor in a cus-
tomer's choice between competing systems, and if for example IBM
failed to improve the price/performance of its peripherals, customers
might choose systems (including peripherals) of other systems man-
ufacturers. For example, the IBM Merlin (3330) disk drive was be-
lieved by IBM to be a critical factor to the competitive
price/performance of the 370 systems 135, 145, 155, 158, 165 and 168.
The 3330 was therefore announced in June of 1970 at a
price/performance designed to make IBM more competitive with
both systems manufacturers and peripheral equipment manufactur-
ers. . . .Peripheral pricing and product announcements of one sys-
tems supplier influence subsequent peripheral pricing and product
announcements of other systems suppliers, although it may be diffi-
cult to identify any given competitive price cut or product improve-
ment as a reaction to a single competitive act.'
The court engaged in something more of a cross-elasticity
analysis with regard to its submarket definitions. While noting a
degree of possible cross-elasticity among, for example, various
kinds of storage devices, the court stated that:
The reality of this situation appears to be that despite some theoret-
ical interchangeability, a rise in the price of one storage device will
cause a substantial number of customers to turn to similar devices
less expensive rather than to use fewer of such devices and more of
other types of devices.52
The court believed that the particular applications and objectives
of each customer's system imposed sufficiently stringent require-
ments to justify the court's submarket definitions.
The court adopted the view of United States v. Grinnell
Corp. 53 that there is "no reason to differentiate" between a "line"
of commerce under section 7 of the Clayton Act 4 and a "part" of
commerce under section 2 of the Sherman Act.55 It rejected, how-
Id. at 277-78.
Id. at 283.
5 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
367 F. Supp. at 366.
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ever, IBM's heavy reliance on the theory of "supply substituta-
bility." IBM argued that the relative ease with which systems
manufacturers, or peripheral equipment manufacturers market-
ing peripherals for non-IBM systems, could change interfaces on
their existing products so as to enable them to be marketed for
use with IBM systems, was sufficient to place such manufacturers
in the same relevant market as IBM and those marketing peri-
pheral equipment for use with IBM systems. The court noted that
the cases cited by IBM for this proposition had arisen in a merger
context under section 7 of the Clayton Act and involved the po-
tential competition doctrine, by which a merger between a com-
petitor within the market and a potential competitor on the edge
of it may be held to be illegal.,
On the basis of the market share data summarized above, 7
the district court concluded that IBM's extremely high share of
the relevant market and submarkets compelled a finding of mo-
nopoly power. After examining each of IBM's acts, the court con-
cluded that all of them involved price reductions which were
"predatory" because they were taken by one having predominant
market shares without justification in the form of lower costs and
with a view toward "suppression" of the PCM's and the inroads
they had made. Specifically, the court found that the 2319A disk
drive offered no significant performance increase over the 2314
series equivalent and carried a price reduction which was not
justified on the basis of reduced manufacturing costs, despite
IBM's contention that the lower price could be explained by reuse
of 2314 units which had been returned by customers who had
switched to PCM products.5" The court held that the price cut
had been camouflaged in the form of a new product so that IBM
could avoid reducing rental prices on all of its installed 2314 series
subsystems, which reduction would have cut approximately $120
million from IBM's annual revenue stream of $514 million on its
installed disk drives. 9 A similar view was taken of the 2319B disk
56 Id.
' See table accompanying note 42 supra.
See 367 F. Supp. at 294.
The camouflage characterization of the 2319A is somewhat difficult to accept. The
large sophisticated customers in the computer industry would presumably have had no
trouble seeing through the camouflage. Those who were 370/145 users would, therefore,
have switched to the 2319A (IBM had no long-term, discounted leases in effect at this
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drive. The court concluded that the price cuts had been designed
by IBM to contain its plug compatible competitors and maintain
dominant control of the disk submarket. The district court found
that, although IBM studies had indicated that FTP would lower
IBM's costs through a decrease in the churning of leased equip-
ment, the primary intent and effect of the plan was "suppression"
of the PCM's and maintenance of monopoly power.6 0
The court found that the 1971 CPU price increase had been
designed to offset reductions in revenue resulting from FTP and
that the 1972 pricing of the new 370/158 and 168 CPU's had had
a similar purpose of offsetting low memory prices. Although the
new CPU's possessed performance improvements and required
additional costs in their design and manufacture, these costs and
improvements were found to have been more than compensated
for by the new price. The court found that, in conjunction with
the 1972 CPU pricing, the price of the field effect transistor mem-
ory used with the 158 and 168 had been deliberately set at a level
below that which IBM knew PCM's would have to charge in order
to enter the market and thus constituted an illegal entry barrier.6
time) or would have bargained for reductions on the 2314 series, with the option of moving
to PCM products when responsive PCM price cuts had been made. IBM may have pro-
tected its revenue by confining the 2319A disk announcement to the 370/145 CPU, but in
so doing it was refraining from tactics deemed predatory by the district court. In any
event, IBM extended 2319 availability to all third generation systems 3 months later and
then made substantial price reductions on all or almost all disk products 8 months later
through its FTP.
367 F. Supp. at 297.
' The district court rejected Telex's arguments that the placing of a minimum mem-
ory within the 370/158 and 168 CPU's was an illegal tie-in under section 3 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970). Although IBM had considered raising the size of the minimum
memory in all 370 CPU's for apparently anti-competitive reasons, the court held that the
field effect transistor memory integration as finally accomplished carried such overwhelm-
ing price/performance advantages as to raise a substantial question of the validity of the
Telex contention. These advantages included the elimination of the need for a separate
memory cooling system, power supply, and other equipment, all of which are required
when memory is not integrated with the CPU. The court also noted that CPU's had been
historically designed to include a minimum main memory and that such memory had
never been separately priced. The court further pointed out that PCM's were still free to
attach their memories to the 158 and 168 CPU's and that Telex and four other IBM
competitors had in fact announced intentions to do so.
The court similarly rejected the argument that the placing of integrated controllers
within System 370 CPU's created illegal ties. The integrated controller, unlike the pre-
vious independent controller, was able to use a part of the CPU's resources to perform its
functions and thus carried valid performance advantages. Indeed, the new controller was
VOL. 53
COMPUTER EQUIPMENT MONOPOLIZATION
The court further concluded that IBM had attempted to
monopolize the relevant market and submarkets. The trial court
thought that the "great weight" of authority required that a rele-
vant market be established in attempted monopolization cases
and that the defendant's actions be shown to present a "danger-
ous probability" of achieving monopoly power therein." This
probability, like monopoly power in monopolization cases, can be
inferred from market share measurements. Attempted monopoli-
zation also requires a finding of specific intent to exclude compet-
itors. The district court believed that such intent was supplied by
the IBM documents which: (1) Demonstrated concern over PCM
advances, and (2) evidenced plans to defend IBM's peripheral
revenues by pricing actions not justified on the basis of lower
costs and undertaken only after specific study of their probable
impact on IBM competitors.13
IV. THE TENTH CIRCUIT DECISION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
reversed the district court on the monopolization issues." Be-
cause of the district court's definition of the relevant market, a
factual determination which the Tenth Circuit regarded as
clearly erroneous, the court then did not have to decide the issue
of attempted monopolization. It also held that the lower court
had incorrectly applied the law to IBM's actions which had been
challenged as acts of monopolization, because those actions,
being routine business tactics within the competitive context of
the industry, would not have constituted the "use" of monopoly
power even if IBM had possessed such power.65
The court stated that two important factors had been over-
looked by the district court in its market definition. The first
not strictly a tie-in at all because the customer was still given the option of using the
independent controller, although at a higher price. The court also noted that the chal-
lenged integrations had not been "shown to have been dictated by specific predatory
objectives on the part of IBM." 367 F. Supp. at 303.
" See the dictum in Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382
U.S. 172, 177-78 (1965). See also American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,
785 (1946), and the cases cited by the district court, 367 F. Supp. at 343.
:3 367 F. Supp. at 301-02.
510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 926.
' Id. at 916.
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was "supply substitutability," the ability of a manufacturer to
change the interfaces on its peripherals at minimal cost and,
thereby, make them plug compatible with other computer sys-
tems. The second was the competition among computer systems
of which peripherals are a significant part. But aside from quoting
part of the district court's finding 38 to the effect that, indirectly
and "to some degree," peripherals attached to non-IBM systems
necessarily compete with peripherals attached to IBM systems,
the court did not develop its second point of systems competition,
but rather relied solely upon the supply substitutability con-
cept. 7
The court was impressed by the minimal development and
manufacturing outlay required to change the interfaces which
allow peripherals to be used with other systems, and pointed to
trial testimony by Mr. Grant, senior vice president of Telex, that
he had in the past advocated such interface modification and that
the engineering expense associated therewith was "minimal.""8
The court also noted that following RCA's decision to withdraw
from the computer industry and to turn its business over to
Sperry Rand Univac, Telex had begun to market its 6420 tape
unit, the Telex equivalent of the IBM fourth generation 3420, for
use with the RCA CPU's. The court further recounted a Telex
letter that was to be sent to systems manufacturers. This letter
had offered to sell plug compatible peripheral equipment to new
systems purchasers, with the equipment to be interfaced with
their CPU's at no cost to the purchasers. The court did not men-
tion whether such offers were accepted, and it seems that gener-
ally they were not. The court believed that the trial court had
been overly swayed by Telex's decision to compete for sales and
leases of peripheral equipment plug compatible only with IBM
CPU's. 9
As for the acts of IBM, the court stated that the district court
had failed to consider whether such acts were "ordinary business
17 Id. at 916-19.
" Id. at 916-17. For further discussion of interface adaptation see text accompanying
notes 129-30 supra. Supply substitutability is discussed in detail at pps 318-20 supra.
" Id. at 917.
VOL. 53
COMPUTER EQUIPMENT MONOPOLIZATION
practices typical of those used in a competitive market," 0 or
whether they constituted the use of monopoly power. The Tenth
Circuit thought that IBM had only utilized "ordinary marketing
methods available to all in the market" and, thus, had not used,
even if it had possessed, monopoly power.7' The court further
pointed to the profit margin of approximately 20 percent ex-
pected by IBM on the products covered by its acts and accord-
ingly viewed the record as failing to present a case of "an eco-
nomic giant" subsidizing unusually low prices with its outside
"reserves or other activities."72 Moreover, IBM's total costs of
development and manufacture were above those of the PCM's.
To support its view that liability attaches only for the use of
monopoly power, the court examined four leading monopolization
cases: United States v. Griffith," United States v. Grinnell
Corp.,7" United States v. Swift & Co.,7" and American Tobacco
Co. v. United States.7" The court pointed out that in Griffith the
defendants had used monopoly power to gain competitive advan-
tages in areas where they enjoyed no monopoly. In Grinnell there
had been "no issue" as to the presence of improper conduct used
to achieve and maintain monopoly power, once the primary issue
of the relevant market had been resolved. Swift had abused its
size and power. In American Tobacco an actual conspiracy had
been found. The court stated that such cases required a finding
of use of monopoly power and that the exceptions to monopoliza-
tion liability, for monopoly thrust upon a defendant by natural
economies of scale or by superior skill, foresight, or business acu-
men, must be "fitted in with" the requirement of a use of monop-
oly power.77 The court rejected that interpretation of United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America,78 which held that "the events
" Id. at 925-26.
Id. at 926.
72 Id.
73 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
7, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
M 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
7: 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
7 510 F.2d at 927.
79 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) [hereinafter cited as Alcoa]. The Second Circuit, per
Judge Learned Hand, decided the case upon certification of lack of a quorum by the
Supreme Court. A number of the Justices had participated in the Justice Department's
investigation and preparation of the case.
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or acts must be entirely involuntary" for the defendant to be
absolved of liability.79
The court believed that "[tihere must be some room to
move for a defendant who sees his market share acquired by
research and technical innovations being eroded by those who
market copies of its products."0 The court thus held that the
Sherman Act could not be construed to protect competitors from
"ordinary competition." Although IBM's task forces and studies
had focused in part on the effects of IBM actions on PCM com-
petitors, the court found that the record demonstrated that such
study was "part of the competitive scene in this volatile business
inhabited by aggressive, skillful businessmen seeking to market
a product cheaper and better than that of their competitors."',
The court concluded this section of its opinion by stating that this
issue was governed by the Supreme Court's opinion in Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States.12 It should be pointed
out, however, that the Times-Picayune language with regard to
a defendant's adoption of acts which have been utilized by its
competitors refers only to the specific intent required to sustain
a charge of attempted monopolization, and not to the general
intent required for a finding of monopolization itself. The Tenth
Circuit found it unnecessary to consider separately the issue of
attempted monopolization, given its view of the nature of IBM's
actions.
V. ANALYSIS OF Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp.
A. Relevant Market
1. Supply Substitutability versus Cross-Elasticity of De-
mand
Neither the district court nor the Tenth Circuit made the
kind of complete analysis of the relevant market which the case
demanded. At the district court level, this failure was due in large
part to insufficient data from which to determine cross-
elasticities of demand. The Tenth Circuit, denying this factual
basis for reversal, opted instead for the "supply substitutability"
" 510 F.2d at 927.
I d.
Id. at 928.
82 345 U.S. 594 (1953), cited in 510 F.2d at 928.
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concept. This concept could enlarge the relevant market to fit
certain measurements which were in the record and which
showed IBM's share thereof to fall generally at or below 45 per-
cent."3
The supply substitutability concept is contrary to both pre-
cedent and proper concepts of market definition. The traditional
test for definition of the relevant market in monopolization cases
was laid down, as the Tenth Circuit recognized, by the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nem-
ours & Co.58 The test is whether one product is "reasonably inter-
changeable" with another. The chief economic and legal determi-
nant of reasonable interchangeability is cross-elasticity of de-
mand. If a modest increase in one product's price will cause buy-
ers to turn to the other product, it can reasonably be assumed
that the two products compete in the same market. The essential
point is that the test revolves around what choices buyers will
make among products offered to them, not what choices manu-
facturers can or, in a court's opinion, should make in the offering
of products to buyers. It may be true that electronic data process-
ing manufacturers can, with relatively little additional expense,
fabricate interfaces enabling their existing peripheral products to
be used with different CPU's, but this phenomena is of absolutely
no help to a buyer who must choose from products presently on
the market. Thus, as the Tenth Circuit stated by quotation from
the du Pont case, the correct formulation of the rule must be:
Where there are market alternatives that buyers may readily use for
their purposes, illegal monopoly does not exist merely because the
product said to be monopolized differs from others.
Market definition depends upon "how far buyers will go to substi-
tute one commodity for another." 6
11 The district court found that IBM's share of the value of all 1971 shipments of
"electronic computers and peripheral equipment, except parts," was 36.7 percent, accord-
ing to the United States Bureau of the Census. Its share of the value of 1971 shipments of
"Electronic Computers, Digital, General Purpose," was 40.9 percent. Similar shares were
found for specific categories of peripheral equipment. But certain IBM internal docu-
ments, apparently based on unit sales and leases, put IBM's share of the domestic market
for systems and peripherals at 75.9 percent in December 1964 and 73.3 percent in Septem-
ber 1968, with IBM's share of CPU's decreasing during the same period from 68.6 percent
to 64.4 percent. 367 F. Supp. at 285-86.
" 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
510 F.2d at 917, quoting from 351 U.S. at 394 (emphasis added).
11 510 F.2d at 918, quoting from 351 U.S. at 380.
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The other cases relied upon by the Tenth Circuit similarly
involved consideration of cross-elasticity of demand and func-
tional interchangeability among existing, not potential, products.
In United States v. Charles Pfizer & Co. 7 it was held that because
other acids could be used by the food and beverage industry for
the same purposes as citric acid, the Government could not pre-
vail on its contention that citric acid alone was the relevant mar-
ket. In Advance Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 8
an attempted monopolization case, it was held that the relevant
market included paper for use in all copiers, not merely those
manufactured by SCM, because all buyers of machines employ-
ing the direct electrostatic process could turn to both SCM's
paper and that of other manufacturers. In South End Oil Co. v.
Texaco, Inc."9 it was held that the relevant market consisted of
all premium motor oils, not merely those of Texaco, because all
such oils are reasonably interchangeable by customers and mar-
keters, and in United States v. Grinnell Corp." the Supreme
Court defined the relevant market on the basis of what "custom-
ers may turn to."'"
As the district court pointed out, the cases relied upon by
IBM to establish the supply substitutability doctrine were merger
cases decided under section 7 of the Clayton Act. These cases
involved the potential competition doctrine, where the existence
of competitors poised at the edge of the market ready for entry is
important in determining the legality of a merger between such
a potential competitor and one already in the market. The doc-
trine thus goes beyond the effects of a merger between two exist-
ing competitors into a somewhat more speculative inquiry. It does
not, however, purport to include the potential competitor within
the relevant market. 92
246 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
287 F. Supp. 143 (D. Md. 1968), modified, 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 920 (1970).
" 237 F. Supp. 650 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
384 U.S. 563 (1966).
" Id. at 571. It should be noted that the Tenth Circuit's characterization of the
Grinnell market as "broadly defined" is open to substantial question.
" There are, of course, a number of reasons that supply substitutability may never
manifest itself in the form of additional products to the consumer. Limited marketing or
manufacturing resources may, for a significant period of time, confine a firm to its existing
consumer markets, assuming that they remain as profitable as other markets. A firm may
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2. One General Peripheral Market versus Submarkets
The Telex trial court found that submarkets existed for each
type of peripheral equipment. These submarkets are the starting
point for a correct definition of relevant markets in the peripheral
equipment part of the computer industry. Judge Christensen took
note of the functional equivalence among, for instance, storage
devices (tapes, disks, and, to some extent, memories) but held
that sufficient differences existed in performance and user appli-
cation requirements to justify separate treatment of each peri-
pheral product. No statistics indicative of demand cross-
elasticities were presented, however, and the submarkets were
not further analyzed because of the similarly dominant IBM
share of each." The Tenth Circuit did not consider the issue.
If the district court is correct that each kind of peripheral
device has sufficient inelasticity of demand with functionally
similar products so as to constitute a separate submarket, it can
be argued that the submarkets are the only relevant markets. An
increase in the price of IBM tape drives, for example, will not
cause significant numbers of users to turn to anyone's disk drives,
whether manufactured by a plug compatible manufacturer, a sys-
tems competitor, or IBM itself. Each of the relevant markets
would include a system manufacturer of each particular kind of
peripheral, along with those who produce plug compatible equiv-
alents of each product type. Manufacturers of competing systems
and peripherals plug compatible with competing systems would
not be included.
Several considerations warrant caution, however, in defining
each type of peripheral as a separate submarket. As the trial court
itself noted, the trend among leading PCM's as well as systems
manufacturers is toward full-line manufacturing and package
selling of peripherals. Such selling may be dictated by design,
marketing, installation, and maintenance economies of scale that
enable peripheral manufacturers to offer product packages at a
significant discount over the regular prices of the packages' indi-
also refrain from taking on a large, successful competitor such as IBM and, instead,
concentrate on profitable sectors where the competition is less substantial.
'1 It would be impossible for IBM to have a high market share in a general peripheral
equipment market without having high shares of each of the major segments thereof (in
terms of units sold and revenue gained).
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vidual components. These packages would then become a new
"product" and market. 4 Moreover, constantly improving tech-
nology toward an accepted industry design goal of product inte-
gration may make the submarkets obsolete as more and more
functions are combined in a single box.
3. Systems Market versus Plug Compatible Market
The district court failed to distinguish between users who
replace peripherals on an existing system and those who buy
peripherals as part of a new system purchase. This latter group
can be viewed as comprising a separate market in which the
system itself is the relevant product. Since peripheral equipment
now comprises 50 to 75 percent of the price of a new system, it is
becoming an increasingly important factor in new system pur-
chases. Systems manufacturers' peripherals compete in the sys-
tems market to the extent that peripherals govern customer
choices among systems built entirely by such manufacturers.,'
Full-line PCM's compete in this same market either as formal
marketers of complete systems retailing their peripherals in com-
bination with other manufacturers' CPU's,16 or as de facto sys-
tems marketers when customers choose a system based on the
price/performance of its available plug compatible peripherals. "
" For example, assume that Telex offers IBM-compatible communication control-
lers, disks, and printers at arbitrarily chosen prices of $20,000, $23,000, and $19,000 respec-
tively. If Memorex offers its equivalents at $23,000, $22,000, and $16,000, a user would
ordinarily choose a Telex controller with a Memorex disk and printer. If, however, Telex
and Memorex each offer 6 percent package discounts, the user will choose the Memorex
package, which has therefore become the new "product." The tendency for packages to
become the relevant products will intensify with larger package discounts and with larger
numbers of peripherals per package. If the package becomes the product, many non-full-
line manufacturers who do not utilize products of others to assemble packages would
compete as suppliers to final manufacturers or package marketers.
,1 For example, if one systems manufacturer offers its CPU at a price of $24,000 and
its peripheral equipment for $20,000 (software, design, and installation costs being propor-
tionately divided between the CPU and the peripherals), while a second systems manufac-
turer offers its CPU for $23,000 but its peripheral equipment for $22,000, and assuming
equivalent performance characteristics between the two systems, the price of the peri-
pheral equipment will determine the choice of systems.
" Telex and other major PCM's have offered new systems consisting of their peri-
pheral equipment and IBM CPU's.
" For example, if the second competitor in the example given in note 95 supra were
IBM, and Telex could offer the user IBM plug compatible peripheral equipment for
$20,000 rather than IBM's price of $22,000, Telex would successfully sell both its peri-
pheral equipment and the entire IBM-based system.
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Smaller PCM's who make a limited range of products would be
included in systems competition only in the rare case where their
products account for at least one-half of a system's price. In addi-
tion, all systems manufacturers and PCM's face competition
within the district court's submarkets from makers of plug com-
patible equivalents as it is fairly common for customers to substi-
tute PCM products for standard peripherals at the time of system
purchase. As a manufacturer of a relatively wide variety of peri-
pherals, Telex should have faced substantial competition on a
systems level from the manufacturer of the system with which its
peripherals are plug compatible (IBM), non-IBM systems manu-
facturers, and those full-line plug compatible manufacturers
which make peripherals compatible with, or market, non-IBM
systems.
Once a user has installed a system, substantial conversion
costs are attendant to any attempt to change systems. These
costs include those of reprogramming, retraining personnel, and
installing the new system. In its Tenth Circuit brief, IBM argued
that, when a salesman of Control Data Corporation calls on an
IBM customer, he attempts to obtain a conversion to a Control
Data system as well as to sell Control Data peripheral replace-
ments on a box-for-box basis. 8 But his chance of obtaining the
system conversion is substantially less than that of obtaining the
box-for-box conversion. To the extent that peripheral-based
price/performance advantages of competing systems can, how-
ever, overcome the conversion cost barrier, their ability to do so
creates systems competition similar to that encountered with new
systems.9
While the district court recognized that systems competition
is distinct from box-for-box peripheral submarket competition, it
appears that the court did not follow its distinction in measuring
market shares, as it did not attempt to ascertain what proportion
s Brief for Appellant at 74.
" Certain classes of customers might be more amenable to systems conversions than
others. For instance, a large customer which has had experience with or employs several
different systems and also employs sophisticated personnel may well be able to absorb
more of what would otherwise make up the conversion cost barrier. Systems manufactur-
ers might also be especially willing to cut prices to gain a toehold on a significant portion




of the total IMM and PCM peripheral installations was made as
a result of new system purchases and what proportion was made
replacing on a box-for-box basis.
4. Third Generation versus Fourth Generation Products
How is the relevant market affected by the "fourth genera-
tion" peripheral products? IBM argued to the court of appeals
that the district court had unfairly lumped together fourth gener-
ation peripherals, in which IBM generally had the originator's
"natural monopoly" during the period under review, with third
generation peripherals, in which IBM's sales were rapidly declin-
ing. Telex replied that the statistics showed IBM's third genera-
tion erosion was due to customer replacement of IBM third gener-
ation peripherals with IBM fourth generation peripherals rather
than with PCM products.
Although the Tenth Circuit did not consider the question,
the answer lies in whether the fourth generation product actually
has, as the new "generation" nomenclature would imply, suffi-
ciently superior price/performance characteristics to constitute a
new market for a substantial number of users. It should be re-
membered, however, that while price and performance are theo-
retically two sides of a single balance, a point will be reached at
which some users will no longer require the improved perform-
ance of a new generation's products. Thus, any price increase may
result in their continuing with existing systems or employing
other systems which offer comparable performance at a lower
price, such as competitors' products of the same generation or
new, smaller systems.
If the fourth generation products offer markedly better
price/performance, substantial numbers of new customers will
purchase only fourth generation systems, including their peri-
pherals. Moreover, most of those who already have systems will
replace them with fourth generation systems or will, depending
upon available product combinations,'"" price, and need, replace
only their peripherals with fourth generation peripherals. Where
systems are to be replaced, a fourth generation systems competi-
tion would arise, as discussed above, among systems and full-line
"' In medium-sized and large systems, IBM fourth generation peripherals are fre-
quently plug compatible with third generation CPU's.
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peripheral manufacturers. Where the user replaces only its peri-
pherals, competition would be confined to the manufacturers of
plug compatible equivalents. Where the user seeks to replace only
its peripherals, but no fourth generation products are available
which are plug compatible with its present CPU, its need for
fourth generation products will create systems competition, be-
cause the price/performance characteristics of the new peripher-
als will overcome the conversion cost barrier; this is true even
though the system conversion might utilize a third generation
CPU with fourth generation peripherals. Once fourth generation
systems have been installed and PCM's have begun to develop
peripheral copies and/or competing systems manufacturers have
changed interfaces on non-compatible fourth generation products
to make them plug compatible, box-for-box submarket competi-
tion will arise.
In all fourth generation markets, some time will elapse be-
tween the innovator's first shipments and those of its competi-
tors. For the PCM's, this time should be regarded as one in which
the innovator, IBM, has a "natural monopoly" prior to the inevi-
table imitation of its product by Telex and others who will market
the copy at a lower price due to lower total costs. As to systems
competitors, who may or may not decide to compete in both the
systems and plug compatible markets, the length of time which
elapses could become important in a general computer industry
monopolization case should the competitor prove unable to pro-
duce fourth generation equipment of similar quality within a rea-
sonable time. This factor is not of importance here, however,
because IBM's declining market shares of general systems reve-
nues were held insufficient to raise an inference of monopoly
power.
Support can be found in the record for the proposition that
fourth generation products form separate markets, particularly
for tapes.'"' The first significant fourth generation tape shipments
apparently began in September 1971, and, between that time and
September 1972, 24,015 such units were shipped by IBM and the
PCM's. During approximately the same period of time, third gen-
eration tape installations decreased by 18,902 units, from 41,409
See text accompanying notes 102-04 infra.
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in June 1971 to 22,507 in December 1972. The district court found
that the 3420 tapes "incorporated significant technological inno-
vations not found in prior tape devices,"'0 2 and stated that the
"Aspen [3420] control units and tape drive embodied significant
new technology.""'3 In the 17 months following the first significant
shipments of fourth generation disks in August 1971, 12,723 of the
IBM and PCM disks were sold or leased. During approximately
the same period of time, third generation disk installations de-
clined by 4,596, leaving a total of 69,274 third generation disks
in use in December 1972. The district court described the Merlin
3830 disk control unit as "innovative.'
0 4
On the other hand, the continued growth through the same
period of PCM installations of third generation tapes and disks
combined with the significant decrease in IBM customers utiliz-
ing third generation products may indicate that for a substantial
number of users the third generation price advantages more than
offset performance benefits from fourth generation products. In
this connection it should be noted that one of the stated purposes
of the IBM 2319A disks was "to provide a lower priced and
smaller disk than Merlin [the fourth generation disk] for use
with the smaller versions of the new System 370 to meet systems
and peripheral competition .... ."10" In addition, IBM's Mr.
Whitcomb testified that IBM "viewed the combination selling of
products by Telex as threatening the migration of 360 users to the
370 system."''0
If the fourth generation peripherals do have sufficient advan-
tages to be considered a separate market, the district court erred
in grouping together third and fourth generation market shares.
In this event, third generation markets would include those cus-
tomers who are primarily concerned with price and not with in-
creased performance, as well as those who have not yet moved
into fourth generation products for financial or other reasons but
plan to do so. IBM's share of these markets should not be consid-
ered sufficient in itself to produce a strong inference of monopoly
"1 367 F. Supp. at 296.
" Id. at 318.
"' Id. at 323.
" Brief for Appellant at 83.
10 Brief for Appellees at 53.
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power. Even if the district court is correct in its definition of
"IBM" equipment as including user-owned and leasing-
company-owned peripherals and in its method of stating percen-
tage shares, the PCM share of third generation tapes rose steadily
from 10.2 percent in December 1970 to 21.6 percent in December
1972. The PCM share of third generation disks during the same
period rose from 6.8 percent to 20.6 percent. In fourth generation
products, IBM should be credited with natural monopoly advan-
tages, which were being rapidly eroded by the PCM's.107
B. Market Share Measurement'
Apart from the district court's failure to distinguish peri-
pherals installed on new IBM systems as part of system conver-
sions from those replaced on a box-for-box basis and the possible
need to distinguish third from fourth generation products, signifi-
cant problems remain in the district court's use of statistics to
produce an inference of monopoly power. The district court con-
sidered as "IBM" equipment at each of the five measuring points
in its December 1970 to December 1972 statistical measuring pe-
riod all tapes and disks which had been manufactured by IBM
a:id were owned by IBM, users, or leasing companies' 9 and in-
'" Telex's fourth generation tape copies became available in November 1971 and its
disk copies became available in October 1972. Telex's first memory copy was available in
November 1972.
" In the following discussion the district court's statistics referred to are those con-
tained in the table accompanying note 42 supra.
"' The trial court's inclusion of leasing company owned IBM equipment in the IBM
share, rather than viewing some or all leasing companies as in competition with IBM, was
not erroneous, although IBM argued to the Tenth Circuit that this inclusion was inconsist-
ent with other findings of the district court. IBM is paid full value for the product when
the leasing company buys it, and a measurement of manufacturer revenues should include
the full payment when received from the leasing company. For purposes of computing unit
sales, leases, or installations, however, IBM leases its equipment in competition with other
manufacturers within the structure of the retail marketplace only at the time of the lease
to the end user. The leasing company is analogous to an IBM wholesaler, not an IBM
competitor. The leasing company purchases equipment from IBM at, in effect, a whole-
saler's price, due to its use of accelerated depreciation allowances and the investment tax
credit. It then charges the end user a rental which is presumably below that charged by
IBM on direct leases. If the rental is sufficiently in range of that charged by IBM so that
it does not make the difference in the end user's choice of systems, the leasing companies'
product should be classified as that of IBM in the competition for the end user's business.
The offer to the end user by IBM itself is effectively replaced by a discount to which IBM
had separately committed itself in advance. If, on the other hand, the leasing company is
substantially below IBM in price so that it obtains a system contract which IBM would
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stalled on IBM-based systems. This number was then compared
with the "PCM" number at each point in the measuring period
to create the percentages relied upon. The district court indicated
that the PCM share includes installed PCM-manufactured
equipment owned by users and leasing companies."10 Since only
the total PCM share is given, it is impossible to determine the
separate effects of PCM sales and leases.
The trial court failed, then, to measure the market shares of
new sales and leases and new installations during the 1969-72
period. New leases should include renewals of lease contracts on
equipment already installed. The defendant should not be penal-
ized for dominating the market during an earlier time which may
not be the subject of any complaint and should be credited with
the full effect of progressively increasing sales of its competitors.
Market share measurements under section 7 of the Clayton Act
customarily examine annual sales, as in United States v. Von's
Grocery Co."' and United States v. General Dynamics Corp."2
The same principle has been followed in section 2 monopolization
cases. Judge Hand, in Alcoa, relied upon annual sales percen-
tages for each of a number of years."'
To determine the number of new sales and leases made by
IBM between December 1971 and December 1972, the increases
in all the peripheral categories of the IBM share within the period
should be compared with the total "PCM" increase during the
same period, i.e., the figures as of December 1971 should be sub-
tracted from those of December 1972. IBM equipment owned by
users and leasing companies in December 1971 clearly cannot be
otherwise lose, the leasing company offer should be similarly treated as an "IBM" price
reduction to win the contract. Leasing company owned equipment which was in inventory
and not on rent to customers correctly was not included in current unit installations by
the trial court.
,"' "[Bloth the PCM's and IBM's share including all devices marketed by them
whether leased or sold." 367 F. Supp. at 288. IBM argued to the Tenth Circuit, however,
that equipment sold by the PCM's had not been so included. Brief for Appellant at 29.
" 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
11 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
"I See also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966). Von's Grocery,
General Dynamics, Alcoa, and Grinnell involved groceries, coal, aluminium, and protec-
tion services; the first three are commodities which are not leased, and the fourth is a
service not subject to the kind of leases found in the computer industry. Coal is also the
subject of long-term requirements contracts.
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said to have been sold thereafter. IBM-owned equipment leased
to users as of December 1971 should similarly not be considered
as having been re-leased within the next year, because by Decem-
ber 1971 it can be inferred the bulk of such leased equipment was
under the fixed-term plan.'" Assuming that the FTP penalty
provisions acted to hold FTP users to their leases, most IBM
equipment under FTP leases as of December 1971 must be
deemed to have been under the same leases for the next year. The
exception would be 1-year FTP leases signed prior to late Decem-
ber 1971, but, in the absence of statistics showing the number of
such leases, their effect cannot be measured. PCM leases in effect
as of December 1971 must also generally be deemed to have con-
tinued through the next year due to widespread PCM employ-
ment of long-term leases." 5
The numbers of certain models of installed IBM-owned and
leasing-company-owned IBM equipment actually declined be-
tween December 1971 and December 1972. These decreases
should not be subtracted from increases in user-owned equip-
ment, because a sale of a previously leased IBM product by either
IBM or a leasing company should be considered a new sale of IBM
equipment,"' even though the equipment was previously under
lease.
"' By July 22, 1971, within 2 months of FTP's introduction, 40 percent of IBM's
installed disks, tapes, and printers had been placed under the fixed-term plan. When
IBM's fourth generation disks and tapes became available in August and September 1971,
respectively, 90 percent of them were installed under FTP.
"I It is likely, however, that more PCM and IBM leases expired during the year
because many of them had commenced before IBM's initiation of FTP between July and
September 1971. Because the PCM shares are not subdivided into sold and leased equip-
ment, it is arbitrarily assumed that all PCM units were owned by PCM's and leased to
users.
"I This proportion is clear when applied to sales of formerly leased equipment which
is owned by IBM. With regard to leasing-company-owned equipment, see the discussion
in note 109 supra.
This inability to offset reduced numbers of leased equipment against increased num-
bers of newly sold equipment is not present with measurement of revenue shares, where a
unit's contribution to revenue resulting from its sale will be offset in part by its ceasing
to provide revenue as a leased product. To this extent, the combination of sales and leases
in one series of measurements, especially without revenue statistics, does not present a
complete picture of the market.
The only revenue statistics cited by the district court were for 1970 and, thus, did
not cover the period measured by the charts on unit sales and leases. The revenue statis-
tics showed that in 1970 IBM had 90 percent of tape revenues and 68 percent of disk
revenues, with the PCM's receiving 10 percent and 32 percent respectively.
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If separate markets do not exist for third and fourth genera-
tion products, new sales and leases can be computed by aggregat-
ing third and fourth generation equipment owned by both IBM
and the PCM's on December 1971 and subtracting the total from
the total number of such installations on December 1972. But, if
separate markets do exist for each generation, then, since IBM
third generation disk and tape installations and PCM third gen-
eration tape installations decreased over the year, these decreases
must be offset against the increases in fourth generation prod-
ucts, because both IBM and PCM leases in effect as of December
1971 are deemed to have been long term. These third generation
lessees are presumed to have been able to break or modify their
leases without incurring termination penalties only by switching
to the fourth generation products of their lessors. Thus, only the
number by which fourth generation leases entered into through
the year exceeds the decline in third generation leases during the
same period can be counted as the number of leases newly made.
When new sales and leases between December 1971 and
December 1972 are computed according to the methods just de-
scribed, the following market shares result. For all tapes, IBM's
share is 81.8 percent and the PCM share is 18.2 percent. In third
generation tapes, PCM installations declined, and IBM's increase
of 706 user-owned units thereby gives it 100 percent, even though
IBM suffered a decline in its leased units of 15,892. In fourth
generation tapes, IBM's share is 90.2 percent, and the PCM share
is 9.8 percent. For all disks, IBM's share is 54.7 percent and the
PCM share is 45.3 percent. In third generation disks, IBM's share
is 44.3 percent and the PCM share is 55.7 percent; IBM's share
is due to an increase of 1,556 user-owned units, as its leased units
declined by 8,937. In fourth generation disks, IBM's share is 99.1
percent, and the PCM's share is .9 percent."'
To measure new sales and leases between December 1970 and
December 1971, the same method should be used, with one possi-
"I The respective shares of new sales and leases of tapes and disks together, which
becomes important if the district court's submarket boundary between the two is not
justified, are as follows: IBM had 69.6 percent and the PCM's 30.4 percent of all tapes
and disks. IBM had 53.6 percent and the PCM's 46.4 percent of third generation tapes




ble exception. It could be argued that merely examining the in-
crease in IBM-owned product installations between December
1970 and June 1971, and possibly between December 1970 and
December 1971, does not accurately portray new leases during
those periods, because, prior to IBM's inauguration of FTP, all
of its leases were 30-day rentals. Thus, all of those who were IBM
lessees in December 1970 were making "new" decisions monthly
to lease IBM products without constraint from lease termination
penalties or other barriers until the introduction and widespread
acceptance of FTP during the second half of 1971. This exception
would not apply to leasing companies because of their general
employment of long-term leases. Similarly, it would appear that
PCM leases were largely long term during the entire 1970-72 pe-
riod.
If all installations of IBM-owned equipment are counted as
having been new leases made between December 1970 and De-
cember 1971, but only the increase in installations of PCM units
within the same period is counted as new leases, IBM's market
shares are extremely high. Because of the variance between these
high market shares and those obtained during the next year's
period as discussed above, not to mention the sharp increase in
the absolute number of PCM installations while the total number
of IBM installations was declining, this method of measuring new
leases is not thought to reflect accurately the dynamics of the
market between December 1970 and December 1971.1
"I Utilizing this method of measurement, IBM's share of third generation tapes sold
and leased between December 1970 and June 1971 was 94.5 percent. IBM had 87.5 percent
of third generation disks for the same period, since significant numbers of fourth genera-
tion products had not yet become available.
For December 1970 to December 1971, IBM had 93.1 percent of third generation
tapes, 99.7 percent of fourth generation tapes, and 93.8 percent of all tapes. For the same
period, the PCM's had 6.9 percent of third generation tapes, 0.3 percent of fourth genera-
tion tapes (PCM fourth generation tapes having just become available), and 6.2 percent
of all tapes. IBM had 84.6 percent of third generation disks, 100 percent of fourth genera-
tion disks, and 85.4 percent of all disks. The PCM's had 15.4 percent, 0 percent, and 14.6
percent, respectively, PCM fourth generation disks not having become available. It should
be noted that these market shares were computed by offsetting increases in user-owned
equipment with decreases in leasing-company-owned equipment, although the other
statistics on new sales and leases do not include such an offset as discussed above. Without
the offset, IBM's market shares were even higher.
When all PCM units as of December 1971 are counted as if they were on short-term
leases similar to those of IBM, the IBM shares decrease to about 80 percent for third
generation and all tapes and 78 percent for third generation and all disks.
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Examination of the shares of new installations as opposed to
new sales and leases shows that, of the combined third and fourth
generation increase in tape installations between December 1970
and December 1972, the PCM share was 48.6 percent. Of the total
increase in disk installations during the same period, the PCM
share was 80.6 percent. IBM installations of third generation
tapes declined substantially, while the PCM's posted an increase.
Both IBM and PCM fourth generation tape installations rose
quickly although IBM still held 91.3 percent of the fourth genera-
tion installations on December 1972. This share, however, seems
to be explained in large measure by IBM's lead time advantage.
IBM's third generation disk installations declined, while PCM
installations almost tripled. The PCM's were just beginning to
market their fourth generation disks at the end of the measuring
period. ",9
The above statistics thus indicate that between December
1971 and December 1972, when all of IBM's challenged acts in-
cluding FTP were in effect, IBM did not have sufficient shares of
new disk or combined tape and disk sales and leases to create an
inference of monopoly power, assuming that third and fourth
generation products should be combined in one market. IBM's
relatively high share of new tape sales and leases is considerably
These statistics are greatly at variance with those obtained for the second year (De-
cember 1971 to December 1972), even though the FTP leases, which apparently benefited
IBM, were only in effect during the second year. The counting of all of IBM's owned
equipment on December or June 1971 as newly leased is probably misleading because IBM
lessees, although renewing 30-day leases, may well have been abandoning such leases as
rapidly as possible. Telex installations were increasing sharply as IBM's lease base dec-
lined and PCM capacity may have been approaching its limits. Moreover, the period
involved is a very short one, and PCM marketing and installation personnel may have
been hard put to increase the conversion rate even had the necessary products been
manufactured. Only 6 months elapsed from December 1970 until IBM announced FTP,
and 40 percent of IBM's lessees signed up under FTP within 2 months after its announce-
ment. It therefore appears that for the 6 to 12 months prior to FTP's having come into
full effect, either statistics derived through the method used for the second year or shares
of sales growth, i.e., new installations, would more accurately portray market realities
than do statistics of actual sales and leases compiled on the assumption that all IBM-
owned equipment can be considered as having been newly leased within the said period.
"I The respective shares of new installations of tapes and disks together are 29.8
percent for IBM and 70.2 percent for the PCM's. The respective shares of new installations
between December 1971 and December 1972 are as follows: IBM had 76.1 percent of tapes
and 50.2 percent of disks; the PCM's had 23.9 percent and 49.8 percent respectively; for
tapes and disks together, IBM had 63.5 percent and the PCM's had 36.5 percent.
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less impressive when the heavy decline in leases is placed against
the increase in sales. If third and fourth generation products form
separate markets, IBM's large fourth generation shares can be
attributed to "natural monopoly" advantages, but with rapid
PCM advances having been made in tapes. The PCM's obtained
55.7 percent of third generation new disk sales and leases. In third
generation tapes, IBM obtained 100 percent, but this share is,
again, put into perspective by the decline in leased units. These
statistics, in conjunction with those pertaining to the relative
shares of new installations over the 2-year period for which statis-
tics were available, raise substantial questions of whether the
district court's aggregate IBM "market shares" in fact reflect the
dynamics of the relevant markets and submarkets during the
period under review.
In summary, the district court made three fundamental er-
rors in its market share measurements. First, it erred in not ex-
amining new sales and leases made within the 1970-72 period
(particularly those between 1971 and 1972) and in not computing
the percentage shares of new installations during the same period.
Second, the court apparently grouped together the peripherals
sold as parts of new systems with those sold as plug-for-plug
replacements, thus failing to distinguish between what it had
found to be two separate markets. A third probable error consis-
ted of joining third generation and fourth generation market
shares. The effect of the first error was to mask rather considera-
bly the market dynamics during the period measured. The effect
of the second is unclear, although it seems reasonable to infer that
the error hurt IBM more than it did Telex, because of IBM's
greater proportion of systems sales to total sales. The effect of the
third error was a failure to show strong PCM advances in the
third generation markets while wrongfully condemning IBM for
its high market shares in the fourth generation markets, where it
held the originator's "natural monopoly."
C. Other Pertinent Factors in Determining Whether Monopoly
Power Exists
Courts should apply to monopolization cases the type of
analysis found in United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 120
1 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
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where market share was held to be only one factor to be consid-
ered in determining the legality of a merger, one which must be
measured against those industry forces tending to explain or
change the market share.
In General Dynamics the Supreme Court conceded that the
Government's market share statistics as to industry concentra-
tion were "roughly comparable" to those in United States v.
Von's Grocery Co., 2 ' which invalidated a merger of the third and
sixth largest grocery store chains in the Los Angeles market. The
merger produced an increase of 1.1 percent in the market share
of the two largest firms in the market and 3.3 percent in the share
of the six largest firms. The Court's opinion in Von's Grocery was
written over a strong dissent by Justice Stewart, joined by Justice
Harlan. The dissent detailed the competitive structure of the
grocery industry in Los Angeles and concluded that
[t]here is simply no evidence in the record, and the Court makes
no attempt to demonstrate, that the increment in market share
obtained by the combined stores can be equated with an increase
in the market power of the combined firm.'2
In General Dynamics Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, re-
stated what he viewed as the principle of Von's Grocery and other
leading merger cases of the 1960's, as allowing
the Government to rest its case [that a merger is likely to substan-
tially lessen competition] on a showing of even small increases of
market share or market concentration in those industries or markets
where concentration is already great or has been recently increasing
123
The Court also said that in the past "this Court has found prima
facie violations of [section] 7 of the Clayton Act from aggregate
statistics of the sort relied on by the United States in this case."' 2
But the Court emphasized that the Government's prima facie
showing should fail if outweighed by "other pertinent factors." In
General Dynamics these factors included the relative decline of
the coal industry vis-a-vis other energy sources, the coal indus-
try's widespread use of long-term requirements contracts which
1 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
I' Id. at 297.
415 U.S. at 497.
'* Id. at 496.
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effectively controlled and explained production statistics, and the
relatively small coal reserves held by the post-merger firm. These
factors were held to so outweigh the Government's market share
statistics as to render unnecessary a review of the district court's
rejection of the Government's proposed relevant markets, be-
cause "the Government's statistical presentation simply did not
establish that a substantial lessening of competition was likely to
occur in any market."'25
When one moves beyond measurement of market shares to a
more general examination of the peripheral equipment market,
other factors appear which make the claim of monopoly power
difficult to sustain. Perhaps the most important factor in addi-
tion to the market shares of those already in the market is the
ease with which potential competitors can enter. Monopoly power
is, after all, "the power to control prices or unreasonably restrict
competition.""'2 The district court found that
entry was initially easy for peripheral equipment manufacturers
because they could choose to copy only proven successful products.
Moreover, they could utilize in many instances systems hardware
provided by the system manufacturer and typically would sell only
after all systems engineering, systems marketing, site preparation
and systems installation work had been completed.'"
With lower total costs than the systems manufacturers, the
PCM's can allow them to incur all development costs, duplicate
their products through reverse engineering, and then bring copies
to market at a lower price.
Entry into the general computer industry has also been easy.
Between 1952 and 1970 the number of industry participants in-
creased from 13 to 1773. The number of systems manufacturers
increased from 3 in 1952 to 96 in 1972. The systems manufacturers
include some of the largest and most sophisticated electronics
companies, such as Sperry Rand Univac, Honeywell, Control
Data, Burroughs, and others. United States Bureau of the Census
figures show IBM's revenue shares of the general computer indus-
try to be well below 50 percent and generally in the 36 to 45
percent range. This share has consistently declined over time.'
Id. at 511.
" 367 F. Supp. at 336.
'" Id. at 286-87.
"2 The district court made reference to certain IBM internal documents, apparently
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Systems manufacturers generally need only change inter-
faces to adapt peripherals from one system to another. Both the
district court and the Tenth Circuit agreed that the cost of such
interface changes "has not constituted a substantial portion of
the development cost of the peripheral device."'' . The total cost
to Telex to adapt one of its early tape drives for use with an IBM
system was $42,000. IBM's evidence showed that the cost of an
interface modification is less than 1 percent of the product's pur-
chase price. ""
In addition major systems competitors are already active in
the IBM plug compatible market, although their products are
often marketed through intermediate assemblers and distribu-
tors. Control Data not only markets IBM plug compatible peri-
pherals under its own name, but also supplies Telex with printer
mechanisms. Sperry Rand, through its Information Storage Sys-
tems subsidiary, supplies Telex with its disk drives. Telex is pre-
sumably able to offer marketing and other economies which make
it feasible for Sperry to proceed through it rather than directly
marketing to IBM customers. As soon as IBM announced its
2319B price reduction, Information Storage Systems granted
Telex a 28 percent price reduction on disk drives. There has also
been some movement by PCM's toward full systems competition.
Memorex announced two complete systems in 1972. Texas Instru-
ments, originally a component manufacturer, markets what was
at the time of the district court trial the world's fastest CPU.
One specific consequence of the actual and potential involve-
ment of large systems manufacturers in the IBM plug compatible
market is to cast considerable doubt on any validity which the
district court's CPU offset theory might otherwise have. The
court found that IBM had offset FTP price reductions with 4 to
8 percent price increases on CPU's and other equipment in 1971
and had in 1972 offered Models 158 and 168 of its System 370
CPU at an unduly high price to subsidize the low price of the field
based on unit sales and leases, which put IBM's share of the domestic systems and
peripherals market at 75.9 percent in December 1964 and 73.3 percent in September 1968,
with IBM's share of CPU's decreasing during the same period from 68.6 percent to 64.4
percent. These and similar figures are relied upon by the Justice Department in its action
against IBM.
,,' 367 F. Supp. at 278.
' Brief for Appellant at 22.
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effect transistor memories offered with the 158 and 168 CPU's.
The offset holding has some initial difficulty in that such a notion
has usually referred to the use of monopoly power or similar re-
serves in one market to gain extra advantages in competitive
markets. ' And yet, the district court found that IBM's market
share of the general systems market did not in itself justify any
inference of monopoly power. This market was also described by
the district court as seeming "competitive and dynamic."'
' 32
Thus, any attempt by IBM to "offset" lower peripheral prices in
the plug compatible markets with price increases in the general
systems market should result in lost sales. Because the systems
and plug compatible markets are linked, such an attempted off-
set would also hurt both IBM and the PCM's in the plug compati-
ble markets by reducing the number of IBM systems which con-
stitute the latter markets.'3 3 Even if, however, such an offset were
economically feasible for IBM, there is nothing to suggest that the
other systems manufacturers who are active in the IBM plug
compatible markets could not engage in similar subsidization. In
its variety of products, Sperry Rand is far more diverse than IBM.
There would appear to be nothing to prevent Sperry from offset-
ting plug compatible pricing actions with systems price increases
or, for that matter, with price increases in its farm equipment or
other product lines, thus utilizing one of the supposed advantages
of the conglomerate or multi-industry company. 134
The extremely fast growth of the computer industry, from
revenues of $48 million in 1952 to $10.2 billion in 1970, militates
against stagnant and dominant market power, particularly that
resulting from single firm growth.'35
Another important factor to be weighed is the "marked in-
crease in the sophistication of EDP customers in the last few
13' See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
132 367 F. Supp. at 286.
'3- Another consequence of the interdependence between the systems and peripheral
markets is that IBM pricing actions in the former will bind it in the latter.
'31 Other plug compatible competitors, such as Honeywell and Control Data, should
likewise be able to engage in such subsidization.
' Gabriel Kolko, in the Triumph of Conservatism, provides a well-documented
study of the inability of even the classical turn-of-the-century monopolists to prevent
market share decline in the face of rapidly expanding markets. G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH
OF CONSERVATISM (1963). See also the dissent of Justice Stewart in United States v. Von's
Grocery, 384 U.S. 270, 281 (1966).
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years." '' 'l The district court pointed out that most computer sys-
tems are installed in the 500 largest governmental and business
organizations. '3 Indeed, IBM's 2319 pricing actions were based
upon increasing concern with plug compatible competition which
had been
intensified in January of 1970 when IBM learned that the Bureau
of the Budget intended to encourage federal agencies to use equiva-
lent lower cost peripheral equipment compatible with CPU's sup-
plied by IBM and by other systems manufacturers and suggested
the utilization of standard interfaces. 138
The 1969-1972 time frame was a narrow one. PCM's had not
engaged in any significant marketing of IBM plug compatible
peripherals until 1966. In third generation products the substan-
tial effects of this competition were taking their toll throughout
the period measured. Telex did not offer its first IBM plug com-
patible disk drive until August 1969. Prior to this disk offering,
Telex had offered tapes in August 1966 and in March 1968. After
the August 1969 disk offering, other product introductions by
Telex continued throughout the period measured. PCM's had
barely begun to market fourth generation disks when the measur-
ing period ended and had only marketed fourth generation tapes
for approximately the last year of the same period.
IBM's success in the peripheral markets was not a result of
patent monopolies. IBM has developed over 10,000 computer in-
dustry patents which are freely licensed, none of which had been
abused or was directly involved in the Telex case.
Although the rate of decline was not always uniform, all of
IBM's market shares were in steady decline throughout the 1969-
1972 period. IBM and the other systems manufacturers have
higher total costs than the PCM's, and they can recoup such costs
against PCM competition only by the constant introduction of
improved products. In an internal document relied upon by the
district court, IBM stated with regard to the anticipated competi-
tive situation upon the expiration of the initial round of FTP
contracts:
' 367 F. Supp. at 272.
'3 Id.
"' Id. at 291.
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While the PC competitors will make a strong effort, it is assumed
that near-term 3330 erosion will be contained until the FTP con-
tracts approach maturity. By that time, Winchester, Iceberg [both
new products], the 3330A/B and the 333M will all be available as
customer options and should hold the market for IBM." 9
IBM could hope to slow its market share decline only by introduc-
ing products offering improved performance and by reducing its
prices where necessary, under pressure from both PCM's and
systems competitors. Rather than evidencing IBM's power to
raise prices or exclude competitors, the record shows that
"[g]enerally speaking, EDP customers have been furnished with
progressively better products at progressively lower prices," 4 " and
this trend was particularly characteristic of the plug compatible
markets during the period under review.
D. Acts of Monopolization
The Tenth Circuit held that IBM's acts did not constitute
the use of monopoly power because they involved ordinary mar-
keting methods utilized by or available to all competitors.' The
court relied particularly on the absence of below-cost pricing or
other subsidizing of plug compatible market activities. The cases
cited by the Tenth Circuit involved practices well beyond those
normally utilized by business competitors. In United States v.
Griffith4 ' the defendants clearly possessed monopoly power in
certain towns and were held to have used it to obtain competitive
advantages in other areas. In United States v. Grinnell Corp. 
43
improper contracts and acquisitions were found to have been ef-
fected. In United States v. Swift & Co.'44 abuse of size and power
was found. In American Tobacco Co. v. United States4 ' a con-
spiracy existed.
The fact that these four cases involved clearly predatory tac-
tics does not mean that such tactics are requisite for acts of mono-
polization. Alcoa stated that to limit acts of monopolization
3 Id. at 303, quoting from IBM internal documents.
"' Id. at 285. See note 40 supra.
510 F.2d at 926.
12 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
113 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
286 U.S. 106 (1932).
"5 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
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to manuevers not honestly industrial . . . would in our judgment
emasculate the [Sherman] Act. . . . We disregard any question of
"intent." . . . [Once monopoly power is shown to exist], the issue
of intent ceases to have any importance; no intent is relevant except
that which is relevant to bring about the forbidden act . . . no
monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing.'
The Tenth Circuit's requirement of use of monopoly power seems
to conflict with this language and the apparent Alcoa holding
that mere anticipation of increases in the demand for Alcoa's
product, aluminum ingot, and the constant expansion of capacity
to meet this demand, was a sufficient act of monopolization
under section 2. These acts of Alcoa were or would have been
normal competitive responses available to other competitors, and
in the absence of Alcoa's high share of what the Second Circuit
found to be the relevant market, they would indeed have been
laudatory. Justice Reed said for the Supreme Court in United
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.:
[Tihis Court's conclusion in prior cases [has been] that, when an
alleged monopolist has power over price and competition, an inten-
tion to monopolize in a proper case may be assumed.'
Even the early authority supports the contention that, while
monopoly power does not give rise to a conclusive presumption
of an intention to monopolize, a rebuttable presumption may so
arise. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States' the Supreme Court
indicated that a presumption of intent to monopolize might arise
from proof of the existence of monopoly power under certain cir-
cumstances.'49
It is submitted, however, that the Tenth Circuit's concern
over acts which are not extraordinary is relevant to the issue of
whether monopoly power exists in the first place, particularly
under the General Dynamics approach. If a defendant has accom-
plished whatever success it enjoys by ordinary marketing meth-
ods, another weight has been placed on the balance against a
finding of monopoly power. But once this power is found to exist,
"1 148 F.2d at 431-32.
17 351 U.S. 377, 392 (1956) (footnotes omitted).
221 U.S. 1 (1911).




the Tenth Circuit's view of the required act of monopolization is
inappropriate, and the Alcoa standard should be followed.
Economic theory tells us that a rational, profit-maximizing
firm truly possessed of monopoly power cannot avoid its use. By
definition, the demand curve facing a monopolist is the same
curve that faces the entire industry. Accordingly, each unit of
output sold by the monopolist directly lowers the price per unit
which it can receive. As a result the marginal revenue curve for a
monopolist will always lie well below the demand curve. When
the monopolist, like the firm in a competitive market, maximizes
profits by setting its output and price at the point where marginal
costs equal marginal revenues, its output will tend to be more
restricted and its prices higher than if the marginal cost curve
were allowed to intersect a marginal revenue curve closer, or
equal, to the demand curve. Monopoly also tends to create long
run excess capacity and production at relatively high costs. 5 "
E. Attempted Monopolization
If this article's analysis of IBM's lack of monopoly power is
correct, there can be no finding that any acts of IBM came "dan-
gerously near" to accomplishing monopoly power in the relevant
markets or might accomplish such a result if continued un-
checked. The ultimate acts of IBM were ordinary and competi-
tive in and of themselves. With regard to causation, the worst
that can be said for all of IBM's acts taken together is that they
may have slowed, but did not stop or reverse, the steady decline
in IBM's market shares. They did not even slow the decline as to
third generation products, and the PCM's also made significant
'-1 DORFMAN, THE PRICE SYSTEM 92-96 (1964). It would seem that only two reasons
might exist for a monopolist's failure to maximize profits, assuming that its information
does not misstate costs or other factors. The first would be to prevent a competitor from
entering the market. In that case, competition is serving its purpose, and it is doubtful
whether monopoly power exists. The second would be a desire to avoid the attention of
antitrust authorities, or, failing that, to avoid liability for an "act" of monopolization.
Avoidance of prosecution by this tactic seems a remote possibility at best and would
probably have a chance of success only if the monopolist's profits were low in the first
place. Avoidance of liability should be impossible because failure to maximize profits,
which further impedes proper flow of capital and allocation of resources, should itself be
considered an act of monopolization in these circumstances, as should the waste of re-
sources inherent in deliberately paying more to produce an item than it is worth. Finally,
insuring that the monopolist continue not to maximize profits would require a regulatory
approach inimical to the purposes of the antitrust laws.
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advances in fourth generation products. IBM's absolute share of
fourth generation peripherals seems to have remained very high
only because PCM activities had just begun.'' It is suggested that
a "specific intent" to monopolize can be shown only by acts which
are not customarily used in business competition and which in
fact cause or threaten monopoly power.
The district court found that IBM had exhibited a specific
intent to monopolize because its actions were aimed directly at
the PCM's and were undertaken only after study of the impact
upon the PCM's and their future activities. Study of one's impact
on competitors, however, is inevitable in all markets, save those
of atomistic competition, and is widely engaged in by modem
firms. IBM cited authority to the Tenth Circuit that "70 to 90%
of American companies evaluate, study and analyze competitors
and competitive products."'' Such study is desirable because it
enables both competitors and potential entrants to rationally al-
locate capital and price/performance moves where they are
needed. Such study is virtua4ly indispensable to the process of
entry. Only by analyzing the position of existing competitors can
capital know what return it will receive and where. Only by such
study can one preparing to offer a better product or lower price
" Telex and the district court were concerned about the FTP attempt to "lock in"
customers, particularly on newly introduced fourth generation equipment. The leases,
however, were only for a 2-year term, which was less than the term offered in the leases
of many competitors. A large part of the 2-year period would have apparently, in the
absence of unlawful appropriation of trade secrets, been necessary as PCM lead time to
copy fourth generation IBM products. Furthermore, the strong and sophisticated custom-
ers in the computer industry might well have been willing to forego FTP in the expectation
of near-term competitive offerings if the PCM's were able to reduce IBM's lead time.
Howard Tilley, administrative assistant to Telex's chairman of the board, reported to the
president of Telex in March 1972, as follows:
Of twenty customers surveyed, only three admit that FTP was a signifi-
cant factor influencing their decision to cancel Telex in favor of IBM. Fur-
thermore, these three list other reasons in conjunction with FTP . . . . No
one indicated a willingness to be a witness although this point was not
pursued vigorously for fear of damaging future customer relationships.
Additionally, this may be a dangerous approach since IBM could proba-
bly produce witnesses to the effect that no FTP agreement was signed be-
cause the customer knew that Telex would be offering an IBM replacement
in the near future, probably at less cost. The survey found that Thiokol
Chemical took a monthly lease on IBM 3420's and that Amoco Production
did the same in anticipation of replacing them with Telex 6420's.
Brief for Appellant at 117.
"I Id. at 98.
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predict the marketplace's receptiveness. The record indicates
that Telex thoroughly studied IBM product offerings and the
effect of PCM pricing actions on IBM. It is inconceivable that
Telex and other PCM's did not make such studies prior to their
initial decisions to enter plug compatible markets. These studies
would seem to be especially needed in the computer industry,
where market definition is difficult due to the changing nature of
product combinations and advancing technology. Both IBM and
Telex must be able to identify those plug compatible markets
where room exists for competing away present profits, thereby
"injuring" present competitors. They must also be able to iden-
tify whether, and to what extent, their resources should be com-
mitted to plug compatible markets, as distinguished from sys-
tems competition.
Study of competitors, then, is a neutral and ordinarily ac-
ceptable technique. It is not an ultimate marketing action, but
is only a means for making decisions to undertake price cuts or
other activities. In no event should the requisite specific intent
be considered established by decisionmaking techniques or intra-
company memoranda, as distinguished from the objective char-
acter of ultimate acts. Memoranda may, in certain cases, help
explain the objective nature of the act, but they often tend to
confuse the issue. No matter how objectionable a memorandum's
words may be, they are of little consequence if their only outcome
is a routine marketing action. Conversely, a sophisticated com-
pany may well seek to mask arguably predatory acts, such as use
of monopoly power in one market to subsidize activities in a
competitive market, with the most innocuous of words. IBM en-
gaged in actions designed to produce a 20 percent profit and was
met by competitive responses on the part of the PCM's. In at
least some instances, IBM's actions also lowered costs. It is from
these characteristics that specific intent should be perceived,
rather than from internal documents projecting the acts' effects
on PCM's or, for that matter, expressing a hope that the effects
would be injurious. If a firm acts in a routine manner, its knowl-
edge that its actions will injure or destroy a competitor cannot
create an affirmative duty to protect the competitor and should
be of no consequence in determining specific intent to monopo-
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lize.' 3 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States'54 indi-
cates that when the acts relied upon to establish specific intent
are available to and used by other competitors, a finding of spe-
cific intent to monopolize is precluded regardless of the relevant
market and the defendant's influence thereon. '5 The sensible
justification for the Times-Picayune view is that, without its defi-
nition of specific intent, we are in reality back to the ordinary
monopolization test, but with the possibility that by establishing
only a "dangerous probability," rather than the actual existence
of monopoly power, the plaintiff can reduce its burden of proof.
VI. SUGGESTED CHANGES IN PRESENT MONOPOLIZATION LAW AND
POLICY
Now that the fear of conglomerates has been lessened by the
economic situation, if not by Justice Department action, concen-
trated or oligopolistic industries have again become a principal
concern of antitrust litigation and theory. The oil, breakfast cer-
eal, and tire industries are presently subjects of antitrust litiga-
tion. Professors Posner' and Turner' 7 are only two of the multi-
tude who have wrestled with the problem of the extent to which
companies, not shown to be in conventional agreement so as to
subject them to liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act' for
restraint of trade, can be attacked under section 2 for joint mono-
polization or can be subjected to new definitions of "agreement"
as including mere "parallelism" of action. Legislation has been
introduced in Congress which would permit dismemberment or
" The relation between the systems and plug compatible markets also makes it
difficult to label IBM's acts, particularly the fixed-term plan, as predatory because they
were aimed at PCM's. The district court found that FTP was undertaken in response to
systems competitors as well as PCM's. The systems market was competitive during the
period under review. And yet, IBM's prices in this competitive market will inevitably
carry over into the plug compatible markets. The irony is that the PCM's must in large
part depend on the systems pricing of IBM for their very existence, but are "injured" by
this pricing to the extent that it undercuts their prices or reduces their profits in the plug
compatible markets.
"' 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
Id. at 626-27.
Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 1562 (1969).
' Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallel-
ism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962).
:' 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
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regulation of firms in industries with prescribed concentration
ratios.'
It is far from a universal belief that a positive correlation
exists between concentration and monopoly power, or even be-
tween concentration and enduring high profits.6 0 But it does
seem clear that all oligopolistic industries exhibit interdependent
decisionmaking which may produce an absence of competition,
especially in pricing. Even in Telex, which involved an extremely
competitive industry, the record discloses that Mr. Finnell of
IBM reported to the management review committee in January
1971, with regard to the 2319B and 3420 pricing policies:
[R]eaction to our recent tape and disk pricing action . . . were
[sic] as expected or lower. We are continuing to update our 1971
forecasts-raises the question of are you really ahead or are you back
to where you started before you adjusted your own prices.'61
It is this kind of statement, and not the drastically competitive
actions engaged in by IBM, which should alarm courts, econo-
mists, and consumers. Fortunately, IBM declined Mr. Finnell's
invitation to refrain from price competition. It has been persu-
asively suggested, however, that in concentrated manufacturing
industries similar invitations are accepted. Large firms live un-
easily under the watchful eyes of both the antitrust authorities
and the general public lest their market shares continue to in-
crease. It therefore seems reasonable to draw the inference that
such firms might deliberately refrain from actions, particularly in
pricing, which risk increase of their market shares and, instead,
take out whatever efficiency advantages they may possess in the
form of increased short-term profit.
Relaxation of present monopolization restraints on single
firm power achieved by internal growth, beginning with an imme-
diate move away from strict adherence to market shares and
toward the General Dynamics form of analysis, might well aid in
the restoration of dynamic price competition in concentrated in-
dustries. Assuming that they are not discouraged from actively
l5 Industrial Reorganization Act, S. 3832, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
1so Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION:
THE NEW LEARNING (Goldschmid, Mann, Weston ed. 1974); Brozen, Bain's Concentration
and Rates of Return Revisited, 14 J. LAW & ECON. 351 (1971).
1 367 F. Supp. at 296.
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studying competitors, firms in such industries would then have
incentive to move immediately against competitors who because
of higher costs or other reasons are vulnerable to competitive
marketing techniques. Although interdependent decisionmaking
is supposedly permeated by the realization that a competitor's
response can wipe out a temporary advantage obtained by a lower
price, it is likely that perceived near-term advantages, such as
those which would accrue to General Motors if it forced Chrysler
to the brink, would produce recurring price competition. Another
advantage of relaxing monopolization restraints would be easier
detection of horizontal collusion in oligopolistic industries be-
cause injuring one's competitors would no longer be proscribed.
The classic argument for the imposition of monopolization
liability in the absence of collusion, merger, or unusually preda-
tory conduct is that once the potential monopolist had used its
advantage to drive competitors from the market, it would raise
prices and restrict output. Even if this prediction were valid, the
new "monopolist" would presumably have only a temporary ad-
vantage in the absence of governmental entry barriers and that
advantage must be weighed against the substantial savings which
may be realized by consumers on the road to such "monopoliza-
tion."
Any monopoly advantage should be quickly overcome. In the
General Motors example, Chrysler might be forced, and thus
able, to respond with methods of lowering its costs and directing
its efforts to more profitable specialties, perhaps with the aid of
partners. Even if forced to exit from the industry, its plants could
be purchased by Ford, American Motors, a foreign competitor, or
by a firm with supply substitutability and proven ability to at-
tract financing, such as International Harvester or Deere & Co.
The extent to which the turn-of-the-century monopolists in
fact possessed anything but a very temporary monopoly power,
and the role of antitrust actions in diminishing such power, has
been heavily discounted over the past two decades."' Alcoa is
perhaps the leading monopolization case, and it probably comes
"I See, e.g., G. KOLKO, supra note 135; McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The
Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. LAW & ECON. 137 (1958). See generally A. KAPLAN, BIG
ENTERPRISE IN A COMPETITIVE SYSTEM (1954).
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closest of all leading section 2 cases to finding maintenance of
monopoly power without conduct independently violative of
other antitrust laws or at least clearly predatory. Like the district
court's holding in Telex, however, Alcoa may well be based on an
erroneous definition of the relevant market. Non-aluminum prod-
ucts were excluded, despite studies demonstrating that alumi-
num has always faced competition from various other materials
for all of its many uses." 3 There is no major use for aluminum
which cannot be, and has not been, filled by other products. Also,
Alcoa probably erred in excluding the effects of secondary alumi-
num ingot competition' 4 and in minimizing the effects of foreign
competition. For years after the Alcoa decision, only two other
major entrants appeared in the aluminum industry, and both
were thrust into their positions by solely governmental acts: The
creation of inflated wartime demand satisfied by new government
plants, which were then sold after World War II to create the new
entrants in an industry chronically plagued in the post-War pe-
riod by excess capacity. One can only speculate on the benefits
which would have resulted had the capital absorbed by this gov-
ernment financing been allowed to flow to potential competitors
in industries with high profits or poor products.
CONCLUSION
The district court in Telex erred in holding IBM liable for
monopolization and attempted monopolization. It relied heavily
on market share statistics rather than balancing those statistics
against other competitive factors in the industry. Moreover, the
accuracy of the district court's market share findings is open to
substantial question. It is also possible that some of the markets
were erroneously defined, particularly because third and fourth
generation products were not considered separately, although
more information is needed before a definite conclusion can be
reached on this point.
The Tenth Circuit overruled the district court's market divi-
sions and defined a new market unwisely founded on the market
" A. KAPLAN supra note 162, at 95-99.
2 S. WHITNEY. ANTITRUST POLICIES: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN TWENTY INDUSTRIES 90
(1958). Inclusion of secondary aluminum alone, with no other changes in the court's
market definition, would have reduced Alcoa's market share to 64 percent.
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definition concept of supply substitutability. It missed the
chance to point out the errors in the district court's market share
statistics and, more importantly, to forthrightly balance competi-
tive industry factors against the market share statistics. Finally,
the Tenth Circuit acted contrary to precedent and economic
theory by holding that an act of monopolization could not consist
of ordinary marketing methods available to other competitors.
Like the supply substitutability concept, however, the fact that
IBM relied only on such methods is important in the initial deter-
mination of the existence of monopoly power.
General Dynamics indicates a willingness by the Supreme
Court to examine all relevant data in taking a dynamic, rather
than static, view of an industry in merger cases, and it is sug-
gested that the same procedure be followed in monopolization
cases. It is also predicted that such an approach in single firm
monopolization cases, where the defendant's conduct has not oth-
erwise violated the antitrust laws, will result in few if any judg-
ments of liability. In attempted monopolization cases, proof of
specific intent and causation should be based on acts which are
beyond the pale of normal competitive conduct and clearly result
in a dangerous probability of monopoly power. This might be
shown by high and increasing market shares and an absence of
entry opportunities for other firms.
In a developed economy, a growing major industry will at-
tract entrants and competition.'65 IBM has successfully, but with
declining market shares, competed with RCA, General Electric,
and other major corporations in the computer industry. It has
been unable to stop the growth of PCM's and has been able to
slow their growth only by continually introducing superior prod-
ucts and by lowering prices. The period from 1969 to 1972 in the
computer industry demonstrated what can happen when a firm
believes it has competitive freedom of action: Competition and
consumers are benefited; some competitors are not.
- See generally F. HAYEK. THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 43-47 (1944).
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